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Abstract
We study how individuals repay their debt using linked data on multiple credit cards.
Repayments are not allocated to the higher interest rate card, which would minimize the
cost of borrowing. Moreover, the degree of misallocation is invariant to the economic
stakes, which is inconsistent with optimization frictions. Instead, we show that repayments
are consistent with a balance-matching heuristic under which the share of repayments
on each card is matched to the share of balances on each card. Balance matching captures
more than half of the predictable variation in repayments and is highly persistent within
individuals over time.
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1 Introduction
Borrowing decisions underpin a broad set of economic behavior. Individuals borrow to smooth
their consumption over the life-cycle, invest in human capital, and purchase durable goods,
among other reasons. Thus, understanding how individuals borrow is an important input for
many elds of economic research and is directly relevant for consumer nancial policy.
In this paper, we examine competing models of how individuals make debt payments –
and thus implicitly how to borrow – across their portfolio of credit cards. We have a dataset
with rich information on credit card contract terms, monthly statements, and repayments for
1.4 million individuals in the United Kingdom over a two-year period. Unlike other leading
credit card datasets, our data allows us to link together multiple credit card accounts held by
the same individual.1 We study how individuals choose to allocate repayments across their
credit cards, holding the total repayment in each month xed.2
The credit card repayment decision is an ideal laboratory for studying borrowing because
behavior that minimizes interest charges – what we refer to as optimal behavior – can be clearly
dened. Consider individuals with debt on exactly two cards: holding the total amount repaid
xed, it is optimal for these individuals to make the minimum payment on both cards, repay as
much as possible on the high interest rate card, and only allocate further payments to the low
interest rate card if they are able to pay o the high interest rate card in full. What sets the credit
card repayment decision apart from many other nancial decisions is that optimal behavior
does not depend on preferences, such as risk preferences or time preferences.3 This allows us
to evaluate models of behavior without having to jointly estimate preference parameters.
1 For instance, neither the OCC’s Consumer Credit Panel nor the CFPB’s Credit Card Database are designed to
permit linking of accounts held by the same individual. The credit bureau datasets that combine information from
multiple accounts held by the same individual do not have information on interest rates or repayments. There are
a number of opt-in panels such as the Mint.com data and Lightspeed Research’s “Ultimate Consumer Panel” that
have information on multiple cards, but only for a self-selected sample of individuals.
2 This type of allocative decision is common. In the U.K. market that we study, 46.1% of credit card holders have two
or more cards, and this group accounts for 72.2% of outstanding balances (FCA, 2016). In the U.S. market, 71.5% of
credit card holders have two or more cards, and this group accounts for 91.8% of balances (authors’ calculations
using a representative sample of 2015 TransUnion credit bureau data).
3 For example, optimal mortgage choices depend on risk preferences (in the decision to use an adjustable or xed
rate mortgage) and time preferences over the real option to renance in the future (see, Campbell and Cocco,
2003). There are very few institutional settings in which optimal mortgage choices can be clearly dened, such as
in the Danish mortgage market (see, Andersen et al., 2017). The optimal credit card spending allocation depends on
rewards programs, such as cash-back or airline points. Even when the terms of the rewards program are known,
the optimal spending allocation depends on individuals’ (idiosyncratic) value of features.
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The rst part of the paper documents that individuals do not optimally allocate their
payments across cards. Our baseline analysis focuses on individuals who hold exactly two cards
in our dataset. For these individuals, the average dierence in Annual Percentage Rate (APR)
between the high and low interest rate cards is 6.3 percentage points, approximately one-third
of the average 19.7% APR in our sample. If these individuals were completely unresponsive
to interest rates, it is natural to assume that they would allocate 50.0% of their payments
to each card on average. To minimize interest charges, we calculate that individuals should
allocate 97.1% of the payments in excess of the minimum to the high APR card.4 We show that
individuals allocate only 51.5% of their excess payments to the high APR card, behavior that is
virtually indistinguishable from the completely non-responsive baseline. In other words, 85%
of individuals should put 100% of their excess payments on the high interest rate card but only
10% do so.5
This nding of non-optimal repayments closely matches prior research by Ponce et al.
(2017) on credit card borrowing in Mexico. While internally valid, whether the non-optimal
behavior among Mexican borrowers reected a more general feature of borrowing behavior
was uncertain, given the relatively limited experience that many Mexican borrowers have with
credit cards. Our nding of virtually identical behavior among U.K. borrowers – with its long
history and high rate of credit card use – suggests that non-optimal credit card borrowing is a
broad phenomenon.6
The second part of the paper examines whether optimization frictions can explain the
observed repayment behavior. In optimal inattention models, individuals face a xed cost of
optimization – such as the time, psychological, or cognitive costs associated with determining
the optimal repayment allocation (Sims, 2003). Because of this xed cost, these models predict
that the degree of misallocation should be decreasing in the nancial stakes of the repayment
decision. We show, however, that the share of misallocated repayments is invariant to the
4 The number is not exactly 100% because sometimes individuals can pay o the full balance by allocating a smaller
amount, in which case they should allocate the remaining amount to the low interest rate card.
5 In Section 3, we show that this result extends to the samples where we observe individuals allocating repayments
across 3, 4, and 5 cards.
6 Credit cards were introduced in the U.K. in 1966, making it the second country after the U.S. to adopt credit cards.
The share of adults with a credit card is 60% in the UK (UK Cards Association, 2017) relative to 9.5% in Mexico
(BBVA, 2015).
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dierence in interest rates across cards (which can be as large as 15 percentage points), the size
of the repayment amount (which can be as high as £800 in a month), as well as a combined
measure of the “nancial stakes” of the repayment decision. We also show that the degree of
misallocation is invariant to the time since account opening, suggesting that a learning model
cannot explain observed behavior.7
The third part of the paper considers a number of dierent heuristics that might better
explain repayment behavior. We consider a balance-matching heuristic under which the share
of repayments on each card is matched to the share of balances on each card. Balance matching
could arise from the salient placement of balances on credit card statements and the broad
tendency for humans, and other species, to engage in “matching behavior” in related choice
environments. Balance matching could also arise from individuals repaying a constant percent-
age of the balance on each card in a given month, a rule-of-thumb that would lead to inecient
behavior on both the allocative and extensive margins. We also consider ve alternative heuris-
tics, including a “1/N” heuristic (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001), in which payments are split evenly
across cards, and the “debt snowball method,” in which payments are concentrated on the card
with the lowest balance, as recommended by some nancial advisors.8
We assess the explanatory power of these dierent repayment models using standard
measures of goodness-of-t (root mean square error, mean absolute error, Pearson’s ρ). To
provide a lower benchmark, we calculate goodness-of-t under the assumption that the per-
centage of repayments on the high APR card is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution
with support on the 0% to 100% interval. To provide an upper benchmark, we use machine
learning techniques to nd the repayment model that maximizes out-of-sample t using a rich
set of explanatory variables.
We nd that balance matching captures more than half of the “predictable variation” in
repayment behavior. That is, based on the range determined by the lower benchmark of random
repayments and the upper benchmark of the machine learning models, we nd that balance
7 Misallocation is similarly invariant to the number of days between payment dates, suggesting that frictions in
coordinating repayments across cards with dierent due dates cannot explain repayment behavior.
8 For example, see syndicated radio host Dave Ramsey: https://www.daveramsey.com/blog/
get-out-of-debt-with-the-debt-snowball-plan. Also see Amar et al. (2011) and Brown and
Lahey (2015) for experimental studies that investigate this hypothesis.
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matching is closer to the upper benchmark on all of our measures. We also show that the
optimal repayment rule and the other heuristic models do not come close to balance matching
in their ability to match the data, capturing less than a quarter of the predictable variation for
most measures.9 In sensitivity analysis, we show that our results are robust to two potential
threats to validity. First, we show that our results are not explained by anchoring on minimum
payments (Keys and Wang, 2018; Navarro-Martinez et al., 2011; Stewart, 2009). Second, we
show that our results are not driven by individuals using automatic payments (“autopay”),
which is rarely used in our baseline sample.
We also evaluate each of our models in “horse race” type analysis where we determine the
best t model on an individual × month basis. In binary tests, balance matching has the best t
for twice as many observations as either the random, optimal, or other heuristics models. In
specications where we allow for multiple types, balance matching is the best t model for
roughly half of the observations in our sample. We also show that balance matching exhibits
a high degree of persistence within individuals over time, suggesting that balance matching
is more than a good statistical model but is actually capturing a stable feature of individual
decision-making.
In addition to providing us with an upper benchmark, the machine learning models allow
us to assess the relative importance of interest rates versus balances in predicting repayment
behavior. Consistent with the poor t of the optimal repayment rule, we nd that interest rates
have low variable importance (i.e., proportional increase in R2) in our machine learning models.
Consistent with the balance matching results, we nd that balances have the highest variable
importance, with variable importance substantially larger than any of the other explanatory
variables. Unlike some other machine learning applications (e.g., Mullianathan and Spiess,
2017), these results are robust across partitions of the data.
Our ndings are related to a number of strands of research. The nding of non-optimal
repayments is closely related to the aforementioned Ponce et al. (2017) study on credit card
borrowing in Mexico, and more broadly related to a larger literature on non-optimal behavior
9 The one exception is the 1/N heuristic, which captures some behavior exactly, and has a comparable goodness-of-t
with the root mean square error metric.
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in consumer nancial markets (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2009; Keys et al., 2016; Jorring, 2018).10
Our investigation of optimal inattention models contributes to active literature on the
explanatory power of these frameworks. For instance, consistent with our ndings, Chetty
et al. (2014) show that individuals in Denmark are inattentive in their pension contributions
regardless of the economic stakes, pushing against models of optimal inattention. In contrast,
in online experiments, Taubinsky et al. (2018) nd sharp evidence that attention to taxes is
increasing in tax rates, supporting these models. While we do not believe there is a single
correct model for behavior, our results suggest that in the credit card repayment domain,
optimal inattention models have little explanatory power.
The balance matching result relates to a well-established literature in psychology on
matching behavior. In a seminal paper, Herrnstein (1961) showed that pigeons peck keys for
food in proportion to the time it takes for the keys to rearm rather than concentrating their eort
on the key that rearms most quickly. This behavior, which became known as the “matching law,”
has since been documented across a number of species. More recently, a large experimental
literature has shown evidence of “probability matching” in repeated choice experiments. For
instance, when faced with repeated choices between a gamble with a 70% chance of winning
and one with a 30% chance of winning, subjects choose gambles in proportion to the chances
of winning, even though choosing the gamble with the higher payo is a dominant strategy
(see Vulkan, 2000 for a review). We discuss this literature, and our relation to it, in more depth
in Section 5. To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides the rst evidence of matching in
the eld.11
The caveats to our analysis largely stem from the fact that we focus on the allocative
decision of how individuals split repayments across their portfolio of credit cards. While this
decision greatly simplies the analysis, our estimates of the degree of non-optimal behavior
should be interpreted as lower bounds relative to a counterfactual in which individuals could
additionally reallocate payments across non-credit card loans (such as mortgages or automobile
loans) or make adjustments on the extensive margin (e.g., by adjusting the tradeo between
10 Our paper is more broadly related to a literature that examines how credit card utilization responds to changes
in contract terms and shocks to income (e.g., Gross and Souleles, 2002; Olafsson and Pagel, 2018; Agarwal et al.,
2018).
11 See DellaVigna (2009) for a review of the evidence on choice heuristics using eld data.
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debt repayment and consumption). As we mention above, our focus on the allocative decision
also naturally leads us to consider “allocative heuristics,” such as balance matching, rather than
heuristics that determine behavior on the extensive margin (repaying a xed percentage of the
balances).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data and presents
summary statistics for our baseline sample. Section 3 presents our results on the optimality
of repayment behavior. Section 4 tests whether optimal inattention and learning can t the
observed behavior. Section 5 lays out alternative heuristics for debt repayment, including
the balance-matching heuristic. Section 6 tests between these repayment models. Section 7
discusses the implications of these results for the industrial organization of credit card markets
and public policy. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Argus Credit Card Data
Our data source is the Argus Information and Advisory Services’ “Credit Card Payments Study”
(CCPS). The CCPS has detailed information on contract terms and billing records from ve
major credit card issuers in the U.K. These issuers have a combined market share of over 40%
and represent a broad range of credit card products and market segments. We have obtained
monthly data covering January 2013 to December 2014 for a 10% representative sample of
individuals in the CCPS who held a credit card with at least one of the ve issuers. Unlike other
leading credit card datasets, the CCPS provides us with anonymized individual-level identiers
that allow us to link together multiple accounts held by the same individual (see Footnote 1).12
2.2 Sample Restrictions
Our interest lies in understanding how individuals make repayment decisions across their
portfolio of credit cards. Holding multiple cards is not uncommon. In the U.K. market, 46.1% of
12 While we do not have data that would allow us to comprehensively examine the representativeness of the CCPS
data, the distribution of interest rates in the CCPS is very similar to the aggregate distribution reported in UK
Cards (2013), suggesting that the CCPS is roughly representative of the entire market.
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credit card holders have two or more cards, and individuals with two or more cards account
for 72.2% of outstanding balances (FCA, 2016).13
Our unit of analysis is the individual × month. In the remainder of the paper, we refer
to individual × months interchangeably as “observations.” All of the credit cards in our data
require payments at a monthly frequency. We consider cards to be in the same “month” if their
billing cycles conclude in the same calendar month. Since billing cycles often conclude near the
end of the calendar month, payment dates are often quite near to each other.14 We construct
separate samples based on the number of credit cards held by the individual in that month in
our dataset (e.g., two cards, three cards, and so on). This is a weak lower bound on the number
of cards held by the individual. In the analysis that follows, we typically start by presenting our
methodology and results for the two-card sample, and then examine how our ndings extend
to individuals with three or more cards.
We implement our sample restrictions at the individual × month level, excluding months
that do not satisfy our restrictions, but otherwise keeping these individuals in our sample. To
focus on repayment decisions, we drop observations where individuals are delinquent or have
defaulted on at least one card in their portfolio, or where individuals pay less than the minimum
due or more than the full balance on at least one card.15 Together, these restrictions drop 2.0%
of individuals and 4.2% of aggregate revolving debt from the two-card sample. Second, we focus
on observations in which individuals hold debt on all of their cards – i.e., they are carrying
“revolving” balances. This ensures that allocating repayments towards the high APR card, in
13 These numbers are even higher in the U.S. market. Using a representative sample of 2015 TransUnion data, we
calculate that 71.5% of credit cards holders have two or more cards, and individuals with two or more cards
account for 91.8% of balances and 91.7% of revolving balances.
14 In the two-card sample, two-thirds of observations have payment dates that are 10 days apart or fewer. See
Figure A4 for a histogram of the dierence in due dates between cards.
15 Paying less than the minimum or more than full balance sometimes results from “mistakes” that are dicult to
interpret with an allocative model of behavior. For instance, zero payments sometimes result from “forgetting”
to put a check in the mail. Similarly, overpayments sometimes result from refunds that are processed after the
individual decides on their payment, which reduce the balance below the payment amount.
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the manner described in Section 3, minimizes interest charges.16,17 These restrictions remove a
further 25% of individuals from the two-card sample. However, since most of these individuals
do not have revolving debt – i.e., they are “transactors” who repay the balances in full each
month – we only drop 12.7% of aggregate revolving debt.
Third, we make a number of sample restrictions so that we focus on observations where
individuals, holding xed total monthly repayments, have scope to reallocate payments across
cards and therefore face an economically meaningful allocative decision. In particular, we drop
a small number of observations where the interest rate is identical across cards, since any
reallocation of payments has no impact on the cost of borrowing. We then drop observations
where the individual pays either the full balance or the minimum payment on all of their cards,
since these individuals do not have any payments to reallocate. Taken together, this third set of
restrictions drops an additional 35.4% of individuals and 24.9% of aggregate revolving debt in
the two-card sample. Appendix Table A1 goes through the third set of restrictions one-by-one.
Most of the reduction is due to dropping individuals who pay exactly the minimum on each
card.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the baseline two-card sample. The average dierence
in APR (for purchases) between the high and low interest rate cards is 6.3 percentage points,
or approximately one-third of the 19.7% average purchase APR in the sample.18 Yet despite
this substantial dierence in prices, utilization is remarkably similar. Purchases are £128 on
the high APR card versus £117 on the low APR card; repayments are £260 on the high APR
card versus £230 on the low APR card; and revolving balances are £2,200 on the high APR
16 A (complicated) feature of credit cards is that if an individual carries no revolving balance at the beginning of
the month, and repays the balance in full, they avoid any interest charges that month. If an individual carries a
revolving balance at the beginning of the month, interest charges are incurred on average daily balance irrespective
of whether the card is repaid in full. We focus on individuals who begin the month with revolving balances on all
cards as it is unambiguously interest-cost-minimizing for these individuals to allocate repayments towards the
high APR card. In other scenarios, it could be interest-cost-minimizing to allocate repayments towards the low
APR (although our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest this is unlikely).
17 One consequence of this restriction is that we omit individuals who have two cards but hold revolving balances
on only one card. In doing so, one potential concern is that we drop individuals who have “fully optimized” by
completely paying o their high interest rate card. If this were the case, then our sample would be selected on
individuals who failed to optimize, raising issues of external validity. However, among individuals who carry debt
on only one card, the majority (61.8%) carry debt on only the high interest rate card, indicating that our sample is
not selected in this manner.
18 This dierence does reect short-term 0% promotional interest rate oers, which account for less than 5% of
account × month observations in the baseline sample.
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card versus £2,054 on the low APR card. This is particularly striking given that credit limits
are almost three times larger than revolving balances on average, indicating that the typical
individual would be able to shift all of their borrowing to the low APR card without exceeding
their credit limit.
3 Optimal Repayments
In this section, we compare actual and interest-cost-minimizing allocation of repayments across
cards. We refer to the interest-cost-minimizing allocation as the “optimal” allocation because
it is hard to think of a (reasonable) scenario where minimizing interest costs would not be
optimal. Holding the total repayment amount on all cards xed, it is optimal for individuals to
make the minimum required payment on all of their cards, repay as much as possible on the
card with the highest interest rate, and only allocate further payments to the lower interest
rate cards if they are able to pay o the highest interest rate card in full.19
We focus on repayments, rather than other measures of credit card use like spending or
revolving balances, because, for repayments, we can clearly dene optimal behavior. In contrast,
optimal spending may depend upon rewards programs, which we do not observe in our data.20
We also do not focus on the optimality of revolving balance allocations because revolving
balances are a “stock” that cannot typically be quickly adjusted.21 Thus, to determine whether
revolving balances are “optimal,” we would need to take a stand on how individuals could
reallocate revolving balances through counterfactual spending and repayment decisions over
time, which would require us to know the individuals’ time preference and their expectations
over future spending and repayment decisions.
Panel A of Figure 1 plots the distribution of actual and optimal payments in the baseline
two-card sample. The distribution of actual repayments appears close to symmetric, with a mass
19 We explicitly rule out the possibility that choosing not to make the minimum payment on a lower interest rate
card could be optimal. Failing to repay the minimum repayment would result in a penalty fee and a marker on the
individual’s credit le.
20 While issuers typically incur only a small cost for the rewards they provide – approximately 1%, see Agarwal et al.
(2015) – individuals might value rewards (such as airline points) at a high enough value to aect optimal spending
decisions.
21 In particular, with the exception of balance transfer products in the prime credit card market, individuals can only
reallocate their stock of revolving balances by adjusting the ow of spending and repayments on a month-by-month
basis.
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point at 50%, and smaller mass points at 33% and 67%. In contrast, the distribution of optimal
repayments is heavily weighted towards the high APR card. It is not optimal for individuals to
place 100% of their payments on the high interest rate card because (ii) they need to pay the
minimum on the low interest rate card and (ii) they are sometimes able to pay o more than
the full balance on the high interest rate card.
Summary data for actual and optimal repayments for the two-card sample is shown in
Table 2. On average, individuals should allocate 70.7% of repayments to the high APR card. If
individuals were completely unresponsive to interest rates, we might expect them to place 50%
of payments on the high interest rate card. On average, individuals allocate 51.2% to the high
interest rate card, which is very close to the completely non-responsive baseline. Individuals,
thus, misallocate 19.5% of their total monthly payment on average.
In Appendix Figure A1 we plot misallocated repayments in excess of the minimum payment.
That is, we subtract out the amount required to make the minimum payment on each card and
then calculate the share of the remaining amount that is allocated across cards. On average,
individuals should allocate 97.1% of payments in excess of the minimum to the high APR card,
whereas in practice they actually allocate 51.5% to that card.22 Alternatively put, over 90% of
individuals should put 100% of their excess payments on the high interest rate card but fewer
than 10% do so. Summary data for payments in excess of minimum are shown in Appendix
Table A2.
Panels B to D of Figure 1 show radar plots of the average percentage of actual and optimal
payments on each card for the samples with 3, 4, and 5 cards. In each of the plots, the cards are
ordered clockwise from the highest to the lowest APR (starting at the rst node clockwise from
“noon”). The polygons for actual payments are symmetric, indicating that the actual percentage
of payments is very similar across cards. The polygons for optimal payments show that it
would be optimal to allocate a substantially higher percentage of payments to the highest APR
card and a substantially lower percentage to the card with the lowest APR.
As we mention in the introduction, these ndings on misallocation are strikingly similar
to those documented by Ponce et al. (2017) using a sample of Mexican credit card holders. In
22 The number is not exactly 100% because sometimes individuals can pay o the full balance by allocating a smaller
amount, in which case they should allocate the remaining amount to the low interest rate card.
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particular, the most comparable result is that the share of payments in excess of the minimum
misallocated to the high APR card is 50% among Mexican credit card holders and 46% among
UK credit card holders. This remarkable similarity shows that misallocation among Mexican
credit card holders is not due to their relatively limited experience with credit cards; in the UK
market penetration is 66% and cards have been available since 1966.
3.1 Costs of Misallocation
What are the costs of the failure to optimize? Our baseline approach is to consider the annualized
interest savings from a counterfactual “steady state” where individuals optimize balances across
the credit cards we observe in our data, subject to the constraint of not exceeding their credit
limits. For the two card sample, we construct the optimal allocation by transferring balances
from the high to the low interest rate card up to the point where the individual “maxes out” their
low interest rate card. With multiple cards, we construct the optimal allocation by allocating as
much of the aggregate balance as possible to the credit card with the lowest interest rate, then
allocating any remaining balance to the card with the next lowest rate, and so on. The interest
savings from this exercise can be thought of as the interest savings that could be achieved if
the individual was immediately and costlessly able to conduct the optimal “balance transfer” of
balances across cards.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the annualized interest savings from this exercise. Average
interest savings are increasing across the number of cards, rising from £65 in the two-card
sample to £248 in the ve-card sample. Because the degree of misallocation is not declining in
the economic stakes of the decision, individuals with larger balances and larger dierences in
interest rates have a substantial cost of misallocation, with the 90th percentile rising from £167
in the two-card sample to £927 in the ve-card sample.
In Appendix B, we present two additional sets of results on the cost of misallocation,
focusing on the two card sample to keep the analysis trackable. First, we repeat the interest
savings calculations above for cards that were excluded by our sample restrictions. For some
excluded observations, such as those with no revolving balances, the interest savings are
zero. For others, such as observations where individuals pay the minimum on both cards,
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the counterfactual steady state yields interest savings. Total savings, which combine positive
savings for borrowers and zero savings for non-borrowers, are roughly one-third those in the
baseline sample.
Second, we consider an alternative approach to calculating the cost of misallocation where
counterfactual interest costs are determined by simulating forward outcomes when individuals
optimally repay their credit cards over time. This simulation is supposed to measure the gains
from “learning” the optimal repayment rule, which the individual can then implement over
time and incrementally shift their balances across cards. While interest savings are small at
rst, we show that over a 12 month time horizon, the interest savings from this incremental
approach is quite similar to the interest savings from our baseline steady state counterfactual.
There are a number of caveats to these calculations. Since our sample covers approximately
40% of the market, we likely only observe a subset of an individuals’ credit card portfolio.
Allowing individuals to optimize over more cards would necessarily lead to a larger cost of
misallocation. And of course, allowing individuals to optimize across dierent types of debt or
across savings and borrowing products would lead to even larger values.
4 Optimization Frictions
In this section, we examine whether optimization frictions can explain repayment behavior. We
start by examining the evidence for optimal inattention models and then turn to the evidence
for models of learning.
4.1 Optimal Inattention
In optimal inattention models, individuals face a xed cost of optimization and only “optimize”
if the benets from doing so are greater than this xed cost (Sims, 2003). Specically, in our
context, individuals are already making positive credit card repayments on all of their cards and
therefore already paying the xed cost of logging into their bank’s website or sending a check.
So by a xed cost of optimization, we having in mind the time, psychological, or cognitive
costs associated with making the optimal repayment relative to making a non-optimal payment
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amount.23 For some individuals, the reduction in interest payments from cost-minimizing may
be too low to rationalize incurring this xed cost.
To investigate this potential explanation, we examine the correlation between the per-
centage of misallocated repayments and the economic stakes of the repayment decision in
the two-card sample. We dene misallocated payments as the dierence between optimal and
actual payments on the high APR card. We examine three measures of the economic stakes:
(i) the dierence in APR across cards, (ii) the total repayment made that month, and (iii) the
“nancial stakes” of the repayment decision, which is dened as the product of the dierence
in APR across cards and the total repayment made that month – and thereby captures the
annualized nancial stakes from the repayment decision. Since the gains from optimizing
are increasing in each of these measures, under the xed cost explanation, the percentage of
misallocated repayments should be declining in these three measures. Moreover, for individuals
with large economics stakes, we would expect the degree of misallocation to be close to zero.24
Panel A of Figure 2 shows a binned-scatter plot of the percentage of misallocated payments
against the dierence in APR between the high and low interest rate cards.25 The at relationship
indicates that individuals are not less likely to misallocate repayments even when there is a large
APR dierence (more than 15 percentage points). Panel B of Figure 2 shows a binned-scatter
plot of the percentage of misallocated payments against total repayments on both cards. Again,
there is no evidence of a decreasing relationship. Indeed, the relationship is increasing because
individuals who make the largest payments can cover the minimum on the low APR card
with a smaller percentage of their overall allocation and thus should allocate an even larger
fraction of payments to the high APR card. Panel C shows there is no evidence of a decreasing
relationship between the percentage of misallocated payments and the nancial stakes. The
23 This contrasts with optimal mortgage renancing (e.g., Keys et al., 2016), a setting where optimization would
require actively soliciting a new mortgage oer.
24 These measures of economics stakes are not randomly assigned. However, it is important to note that the lack of
random assignment is only a threat to “external validity” and not to “identication”. Specically, the fact that
there are some individuals who do not optimize despite large incentives to do so implies that there are some
individuals whose behavior cannot be rationalized by an inattention model. What requires a stronger assumption
is to infer from this pattern that even individuals with small gains from optimization would still not optimize if
they faced large incentives to do so.
25 The binned-scatter plot is constructed by partitioning the x-axis variable into 20 equal-sized groups and plotting
the mean of the y-axis and x-axis variables for each group. See Chetty et al. (2014) for more details on the
binned-scatter plot methodology.
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relationship is slightly increasing for the same reason as the relationship with total payments.
Table 3 presents summary statistics on actual, optimal and misallocated payments by quintiles
of these measures of economics stakes.26
4.2 Learning
An alternative explanation for the observed non-optimal behavior is that individuals learn over
time (e.g., since opening a card) and that our analysis of the cross-sectional distribution of
repayments masks this learning behavior. A model with time-varying adjustment costs (in the
spirit of Calvo, 1983) would also generate a gradual reduction in the degree of misallocation
over time.
Panel A of Figure 3 examines this explanation by showing a binned-scatter plot of the
percentage of misallocated payments against the age (in months) of the high APR card. For
this analysis, we restrict the sample to individuals who open a high APR during our sample
period and for whom we can observe economically meaningful allocation decisions for 10
consecutive months. In the plot, the horizontal axis starts in the second month after opening,
since this is the rst month in which individuals could have a balance on the high APR card to
repay. The plot shows no evidence of a reduction in the percentage of misallocated repayments
over time.27 This nding suggests that neither learning nor time-varying adjustment costs can
explain the observed non-optimizing behavior.
A related explanation is that individuals have diculty optimizing repayments across
cards when the due dates are far apart in time. From a cognitive perspective, individuals may be
less likely to process credit card repayments as a joint decision when the due dates are far apart.
From a budgetary perspective, individuals may face within-month liquidity constraints that
prevent them from optimally reallocating payments. For example, individuals might receive
their paycheck between credit card due dates, and therefore have dierent amounts of cash-on-
hand when making their payments. Panel B of Figure 3 examines this explanation by showing
a binned-scatter plot of the percentage of misallocated payments against the dierence in
26 Appendix Figure A2 and Appendix Table A4 present the analogous results for misallocated payments in excess of
the minimum payment.
27 Table 3 shows that summary statistics that correspond to this gure. Appendix Figure A3 and Appendix Table A4
present the analogous results for misallocated payments in excess of the minimum payment.
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payment due dates.28 The at relationship indicates that these type of within-month allocation
frictions cannot explain our result.
While it would be tempting to go beyond this simple analysis and try to quantify the xed
costs required to rationalize observed repayment behavior, doing so would require making
strong, untestable assumptions. In particular, a key decision is whether to model optimization
frictions as a xed cost that needs to be paid every period (e.g., a transaction cost of adjusting
repayments) or as a xed cost that only needs to be paid once (e.g., a one-time cognitive cost of
learning the optimal repayment rule). The estimated xed costs would largely be determined
by this modeling decision. If we assumed there was a period-by-period xed cost, repayment
behavior could be rationalized by modest optimization frictions. If, instead, we assumed there
was a one-time xed cost, the benets of learning the optimal rule could be as large as the
discounted sum of interest savings from optimal credit card payments over the life cycle, which
would imply a very large xed cost of adjustment. Since that data do not provide us with
guidance on the appropriate modeling assumption, we are hesitant to undertake this exercise.
5 Heuristics
If individuals do not allocate their payments in an optimal – or constrained optimal – manner,
what explains credit card repayments? In the remainder of this paper, we evaluate heuristics
that might better explain the allocation of repayments. In this section, we introduce the set of
heuristics that we consider. In Section 6, we evaluate the explanatory power of these heuristics.
5.1 Balance Matching
We rst consider a balance-matching heuristic under which individuals match the share of
repayments on each card to the share of balances on each card. Let k = 1 . . .K index cards, pk
indicate payments, and qk indicate balances. Balance-matching payments are given by
pk∑K
κ=1 pκ
=
qk∑K
κ=1 qκ
for k = 1 . . .K (1)
28 Table 3 shows the summary statistics that correspond to this gure. Appendix Figure A3 and Appendix Table A4
present the analogous results for misallocated payments in excess of the minimum payment.
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subject to the constraint that the individual pays at least the minimum and no more than the
full balance on any of their cards.29
Repayments consistent with balance matching could arise from the salient placement of
balances on credit card statements and the broad tendency for human (and other species) to
engage in “matching behavior” in related choice environments. As shown in Appendix Figure A5,
balances are perhaps the most prominently displayed element on credit card statements. The
psychological theory of anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) suggests that individuals
might make payments in relation to saliently displayed balances (instead of less saliently
displayed interest rates).30,31
The literature on matching behavior traces back to Herrnstein (1961), who showed that
pigeons peck keys for food in proportion to the time it takes the keys to rearm rather than
concentrating their eort on the key that rearms most quickly. Follow-up studies replicated
Herrnstein’s “matching law” among pigeons (Miller, 1976; Baum, 1974) and documented similar
behavior among rats (Jacquet, 1972), sh (Behrend and Bitterman, 1961), and humans when
undertaking more complex tasks (e.g., Skinner et al., 1996). Writing at the time, Arrow (1958)
noted that these results challenged conventional economic models of behavior.32
Matching behavior has perhaps been most widely documented among humans in repeated
lottery choice experiments. In a typical study, subjects are asked to make repeated choices
between, say, a gamble with a 70% probability of winning and one with a 30% probability
of winning. In behavior known as “probability matching,” subjects consistently place bets in
proportion to the probabilities of winning, even though betting on the option with the highest
probability rst-order stochastically dominants any other decision. The most well-known
29 In the two-card sample, only 13.0% of observations are aected by these constraints. In nearly all of these cases,
the balance-matching payment is less than 2 percentage points below the minimum payment amount. Treating
these observations in other ways (e.g., dropping these observations) does not have a material impact on the results.
30 A second reason why balances may be more salient is that balances are denoted in the same units as repayments
(£s), whereas APR take on dierent units (%).
31 Balances also enter the minimum payment formula. Therefore, at least in principle, repayments might depend on
balances indirectly through the minimum payment amount. We discuss this issue in Appendix C and show that
this channel does not explain our results.
32 “We have here an experimental situation which is essentially of an economic nature in the sense of seeking to
achieve a maximum of expected reward, and yet the individual does not in fact, at any point, even in a limit, reach
the optimal behavior. I suggest that this result points out strongly the importance of learning theory, not only in
the greater understanding of the dynamics of economic behavior, but even in suggesting that equilibria maybe be
dierent from those that we have predicted in our usual theory.” Arrow (1958) p.14.
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papers in the literature are Rubinstein (2002), Gal (1996) and Loomes (1998). See Vulkan (2000)
for a review paper that documents probability matching, and its limitations, across 22 repeated
lottery experiments.
Of course, we do not propose balance matching as a precise description of individual
repayment behavior. Pigeons do not measure the time it takes the keys to rearm with a stopwatch
and we do not mean to suggest that individuals use long division to calculate the share of
repayments that should be allocated to each card. Instead, we propose that individuals use
balance matching as an “anchor” for their repayment behavior (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Indeed, since credit card balances are fairly stable over time, an individual could approximate a
balance-matching rule without knowing the exact balance on each card that month.33
Finally, as we mention in the introduction, repayments consistent with balance matching
could arise from individuals repaying a constant percentage of the balance on each card in a
given month. If this percentage changes within individuals over time (e.g., 10% in January, 15%
in February, etc.) it would be dicult to distinguish a constant percentage model from a balance
matching model. If this percentage is xed within individuals over time, we could distinguish
between these models using random time-series variation in balances. Unfortunately, we do
not have random time-series variation in balances, and the observed variation is likely to be
driven by factors that also aect repayment decisions.
5.2 1/N Rule
The spike in repayments at 50% (see Panel A of Figure 1) suggests that some individuals use a
simple 1/N heuristic in which they make equal-sized repayments across cards, analogous to
the 1/N heuristic documented in dened-contribution savings decisions (Benartzi and Thaler,
2001). In particular, the excess mass of individuals who make payments at a one-to-one ratio is
approximately 8.2%. If we add in the excess mass at one-to-two and two-to-one ratios, we can
explain 11.7% of repayments.34
33 Ponce et al. (2017) show that there is a positive correlation between the share of payments towards cards and
the share of debt held on cards, suggesting an approximate balance-matching rule may be at work among their
sample of Mexican cardholders.
34 By excess mass, we are using the terminology that Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) use to describe bunching in
response to kinked tax schedules. In our context, the excess mass is the area in excess of what is predicted by a
linear extrapolation between points on the histogram just to the left and the right of the 1/N values.
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While it would be nice to conclude that 11.7% of individuals repay according to a 1/N
rule, there are a number of factors which suggest a more nuanced interpretation of the data.
First, the 1/N rule could be interpreted as an anchor that individuals do not implement exactly.
For example, an individual who pays £250 on card A and £225 on card B might be intending
to split repayments. To account for this possibility, we will measure the performance of the
1/N heuristic in our goodness of t analysis below. This analysis will gauge how well the 1/N
heuristic ts the data, even when it does not t behavior exactly.
A second nuance arises from the fact that 1/N behavior is disproportionally concentrated
amount individuals who “round” their payments to £50, £100, £200, and so on. If an individual
rounds up a payment on card A from £80 to £100 and rounds down a payment on card B from
£120 to £100, then the individual would appear as if they intended to make equal-sized payments,
even though, absent rounding, the share of payments on each card would be substantially
dierent from 50%.
Figure 4 investigates this competing explanation for the spike at 50%. Panel A plots the
distribution of payments on the high APR card in pounds, and shows substantial evidence of
rounding. We calculate that 19.2% of payments take on values that are multiples of £100, and
33% of payments take on values that are multiples of £50 (which obviously includes payments
that are multiples of £100). Panels B and C show the percentage of payments on the high APR
card, splitting the sample by whether the individual makes round number payments (dened
as multiples of £50) or “non-round” number payments on the high APR card.35
The plots show that the peaks at 50% (as well as 33% and 66%) are heavily concentrated
among individuals who make round number repayments. In the non-round sample, there is
only a small spike at 50%, and no discernible spike at 33% or 66%. Thus, at the extreme, we
cannot reject the view that nearly all of the spike at 50% is due to rounding. However, since
we do not have random variation in whether individuals round, we cannot rule out the other
extreme that all of these individuals would have allocated 50% on the high APR card if they
35 The propensity to make round number payments is highly correlated across cards within an individual × month.
We calculate that 73% of individuals who make a round number payment on the high APR card also make a round
number payment on the low APR card, and 78% of individuals who make a non-round number payment on the
high APR card also make a non-round number payment on the low APR card. Dividing the sample into individuals
who make round number repayments on both cards, non-round number repayments on both cards, and a mix of
round and non-round repayments complicates the exposition without changing the results.
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had counterfactually not rounded their payments.
Thus, the quantitative importance of 1/N depends upon what assumptions we are willing
to make. If we think 1/N is something that individuals implement exactly, then the 1/N rule
captures at most 11.7% of repayments, and possibly a lower percentage if we believe that some
of this is due to rounding. If we view 1/N as an anchor that individuals approximate, then
it is best to judge the empirical relevance of this measure in the goodness of t analysis that
follows.
5.3 Other Heuristic Models of Repayment
We also consider four alternative heuristics that capture intuitive economic and non-economic
approaches to the allocation of payments. Some of these heuristics are based on the capacity of
a credit card, which we dene as the dierence between the credit limit and current balance
in pounds. We describe these heuristics for the two-card sample, but they could be naturally
extended to settings with three or more cards.
• Heuristic 1: Repay the card with the lowest capacity. Allocate payments to the lowest
capacity card, subject to paying the minimum on both cards. Once capacity is equalized
across cards, allocate additional payments to both cards equally. Intuitively, by focusing
payments on the card with the lowest capacity, this heuristic reduces the risk that an
accidental purchase will put an individual over their credit limit, which would incur an
over-limit fee and marker on the individual’s credit le.
• Heuristic 2: Repay the card with the highest capacity. Allocate payments to the highest
capacity card, subject to paying the minimum on both cards. Once the highest capacity
card is fully repaid, allocate remaining payments to the other card. Intuitively, by allo-
cating payments to the card with the highest capacity, this heuristic creates maximum
“space” for making a large purchase on a single card (e.g., buying a television).
• Heuristic 3: Repay the card with the highest balance. Allocate payments to the highest
balance card, subject to paying the minimum on the other card. Once balances are
equalized across cards, allocate additional payments to both cards equally. If individuals
dislike having a credit card with a large balance, this heuristic reduces the maximum
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balance they are carrying, and thus might explain repayment behavior.
• Heuristic 4: Repay the card with the lowest balance (“debt snowball method”). Allocate
payments to the lowest balance card, subject to paying the minimum on the other card.
Once the balance on the lowest balance card is paid down to zero, allocate any additional
payments to the other card. This heuristic is sometimes referred to as the debt snowball
method by nancial advisors. Proponents argue that paying o a card with a low balance
generates a “win” that motivates further repayment behavior.36 If an individual fully
pays o a card, this heuristic has the additional benet of “simplifying” the individual’s
debt portfolio. See also Amar et al. (2011) and Brown and Lahey (2015) for laboratory
evidence on this approach to debt repayment.
5.4 Interest Payments Under Dierent Heuristics
How costly would it be for consumers to follow these heuristics? We calculate annualized
interest savings for the steady state balances that would arise from each of the dierent heuristic
models. For example, if consumers follow a balance matching heuristic, then the process of
making larger payments on the card with the larger balance would cause balances to asymptote
to a steady state with equal balances on each card.37
Appendix Table A5 shows the distribution of annualized interest savings (compared to
actual interest payments) under each heuristic for the two-card sample. We show the interest
saving from optimal payment on the rst row as a benchmark and omit the 1/N heuristic
because steady state balances are unchanged and interest savings are therefore zero. All the
heuristics have median savings close to zero, but have wide dispersion in savings or losses
36 For example, syndicated radio host Dave Ramsey argues: “But when you ditch the small debt rst, you see
progress. That one debt is out of your life forever. Soon the second debt will follow, and then the next. These
little wins will give you a condence boost, you’ll see that the plan is working, and you’ll stick to it” (see
https://www.daveramsey.com/blog/top-5-debt-snowball-questions-answered).
37 The steady state outcomes of the other heuristics are as follows. Under the 1/N heuristic, payments are equal
across cards, and the steady state balances are unchanged relative to the status quo. Under Heuristic 1 (repay
the card with the lowest capacity), payments are prioritized to the card with the lowest capacity, and in steady
state capacities on the two cards are equalized, subject to credit limits. Under Heuristic 2 (repay the card with
the highest capacity), payments are prioritized to the card with the highest capacity, and in steady state balance
are reduced as much as possible on that card, subject to credit limits. Under Heuristic 3 (repay the card with the
highest balance), payments are prioritized to the card with the highest balance, and in steady state the balances
on the two cards are equalized, subject to credit limits. Under Heuristic 4 (repay the card with the lowest balance),
payments are prioritized to the card with the lowest balance, and in steady state balance are minimized on that
card, subject to credit limits.
21
across observations. This wide dispersion occurs because the heuristics prioritize payments
to cards based on balances (and credit limits), which is not systematically correlated with the
optimal behavior of prioritizing payments toward the high APR card.
6 Testing Repayment Models
We evaluate balance matching and the other heuristics using two statistical approaches. First,
we measure the distance between observed and predicted behavior using standard measures of
goodness-of-t (root mean square error, mean absolute error, Pearson’s ρ). The goal of this
analysis is to nd the single model that best ts the data. Second, we evaluate the performance
of our models in “horse race” type analysis where we determine the best t model on an
observation-by-observation basis. We conduct binary comparisons where we compare each
model to a single alternative, and horse races with 3 or more models, which allows us to classify
observations into heterogenous types. We also examine the persistence of the best t model
within individuals over time.
6.1 Goodness-of-Fit
We start by presenting visual evidence on the goodness-of-t of the balance-matching heuristic.
Figure 5 examines t in the two-card sample. The left column shows the marginal distributions
of actual and balance-matching payments on the high APR card. The right column displays the
joint distribution using a contour plot. The top row shows these relationships for the baseline
sample and the bottom row focuses on the sample with non-round number payment amounts.
The sample with round number payment amounts is shown in Figure A6.
The histograms (left column) show that the marginal distributions of actual and balance-
matching payments are quite similar, except for the spikes at 33%, 50%, and 66%. The higher
mass along the 45 degree line in the joint densities (right column) indicates that actual and
balance-matching payments are strongly correlated. The correlation is stronger in the non-
round payment sample (and weaker in the round number payment sample).38
38 The weaker correlation in the round payment sample is consistent with a two-stage model in which individuals
rst decide to make balance-matching payments and then add noise to the process by rounding their repayment
amounts. While the heaping in Panel A of Figure 4 provides clear evidence of rounding, estimating a two-stage
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Figure 6 examines the t of the balance-matching model in the samples with 3, 4, and 5
cards. The left column shows marginal distributions of the share of payments on the highest
APR card. The right column shows radar plots of the average share of actual and balance-
matching payments. In each of the radar plots, the cards are ordered clockwise from the highest
to the lowest balance (starting at the rst node clockwise from noon). The distribution of
payments on the high APR card (left column) is similar to predicted payments under balance
matching. The radar plots (right column) show that the average share of payments is fairly close
to those predicted by balance matching, especially compared to the radar plots that examine
optimal repayment behavior (Figure 1).
We formally measure the performance of the balance matching and alternative models
using three standard measures of goodness-of-t: the square root of the mean square error
(RMSE), the mean absolute error (MAE), and the correlation between actual and predicted pay-
ments (Pearson’s ρ).39 To help interpret the goodness-of-t values, we also establish lower and
upper benchmarks. For a lower benchmark, we calculate goodness-of-t under the assumption
that the percentage of repayments on the high APR card is randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution with support on the 0% to 100% interval. To provide an upper benchmark, we
use machine learning techniques to construct a set of purely statistical models of repayment
behavior. Specically, we estimate decision tree, random forest, and extreme gradient boosting
models of the percentage of payments allocated to the high APR card. We use the same set
of variables which enter into our heuristics (APRs, balances, spending and credit limits on
both cards) as input variables and “tune” the models to maximize out-of-sample power using
standard methods from machine learning.40 We use 80% of the data sample as the “training”
sample and measure out-of-sample t on a 20% “hold-out” sample. For consistency, in the
analysis that follows, we compare all models using the hold-out sample. Technical details are
provided in Appendix A.
model where individuals round in the second stage is dicult because the second stage rounding function is not
“invertible.” That is, it is hard to know whether an individual who is paying £100 would have counterfactually paid
£95 or £105 if they had not rounded their payment.
39 Pearson’s ρ is also the square root of the R2 from a univariate regression of actual payments on predicted payments.
40 We view these machine learning models as “prior-free” models of repayment behavior. If we additionally include
our candidate models (optimal, balance matching, and the other heuristics) as input variables, we obtain only
small improvements in model t.
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Figure 7 shows these measures of goodness-of-t under the dierent models. (Appendix
Table A6 shows the underlying numerical amounts with bootstrapped standard errors, con-
structed by drawing with replacement from the hold-out sample.) The optimal model yields
only a very small improvement in the RMSE and MAE relative to the lower benchmark. The
optimal model does generate a meaningful increase in the Pearson correlation, although this is
partly because the lower benchmark (uniformly distributed random amount) is constructed
to have a Pearson correlation of 0. The other heuristics perform similarly poorly, with the
goodness-of-t measures generally falling less than a quarter of the way between the lower
and upper benchmarks.41
The goodness-of-t measures for the balance-matching model fall slightly more than
halfway between the lower and upper benchmarks, indicating that balance matching captures
more than half of the “predictable variation” in repayment behavior. Appendix Figure A7
shows goodness-of-t separately for the round and non-round samples (dened as multiples of
£50). The balance-matching model captures a larger fraction of the predictable variation in the
non-round number sample, which is consistent with a two-stage model of payments discussed
in Footnote 38.
There are two ways to view the performance of the balance-matching model relative to
the upper benchmark provided by the machine learning models. The glass half full view is
that being able to capture more than half of the predictable variation in repayment behavior
with a simple balance matching model is useful. Balance matching is easy to understand, has a
psychological underpinning based on existing theories of behavior (e.g., probability matching,
Herrnstein’s matching law), and might provide intuition for individual behavior in yet-to-be-
studied environments. The glass half empty perspective is that machine learning techniques
provide higher predictive power. Thus, if the goal is prediction – rather than understanding
human behavior – machine learning techniques may be preferable.
41 Appendix Figure A8 shows the marginal distributions of actual and predicted payments under each of the
alternative heuristics. One common feature of these alternative heuristics is that they predict that individuals
should often concentrate their excess payments on a single card. For instance, under Heuristic 1 (repay the card
with the lowest capacity), individuals should fully allocate repayments, in excess of the minimum, to the card
with the lowest capacity until the point where both cards have equal capacity remaining. Individuals, however,
seem to avoid “corner solutions” in their repayment behavior. As a result, the alternative heuristics over-predicted
the share of individuals who allocate a very small (less 10%) or very large (greater than 90%) share of payments to
the high APR card.
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6.2 Horse Races Between Alternative Models
We next evaluate these models using “horse races” where we determine the best t model
on an observation-by-observation basis. A model that ts a smaller number of observations
very poorly, but a larger number quite well, might perform poorly under the goodness-of-t
analysis, but would perform well under this approach.
Our ability to identify the best-t model on an observation-by-observation basis is due to
the unique nature of the credit card repayment decision. As discussed in Section 1, what sets
credit card repayments apart from many other nancial decisions is that optimal behavior does
not depend on preferences (such as risk preferences or time preferences). If preferences were
important for optimal behavior, then conducting this type of exercise would require recovering
preferences at the individual level, which would constitute a signicant empirical challenge.
Table 4 shows results of this horse race analysis in the pooled sample of individual ×
months. Panel A compares each of our models one-by-one against the lower benchmark
where the percentage of repayments on the high APR card is randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution with support on the 0% to 100% interval. In a binary comparison, balance matching
is the best t model for 67.2% of observations, or about twice the percentage of the uniform
benchmark. The optimal model and the other heuristics are the closest for slightly more than
half of the observations, and therefore perform only slightly better than the uniform benchmark.
The machine learning models have the best t for between 69.0% and 76.5% of observations,
which is similar to balance matching.42
Panel B of Table 4 compares each of the models one-by-one to the balance-matching
model.43 In a horse race with the optimal model, balance matching has the best t for slightly
more than two-thirds of observations. When compared with the other heuristic models, balance
matching is also the best t for approximately two-thirds of observations. Balance matching
performs comparably to, or only a little worse than, the machine learning models, with balance
matching exhibiting the best t for 40.9% to 50.0% of observations.44
42 Since the machine learning models were tuned to minimize RMSE, it is natural for these models to perform
relatively better when evaluated using RMSE (and other distance metrics) than when evaluated using this type of
horse race analysis.
43 We exclude a comparison of the balance-matching and the uniform model, since it was shown in Panel A.
44 In unreported analysis, we examined whether there was correlation between the best t model and postal
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The binary comparisons are useful for nding the single model that ts the largest per-
centage of observations. A complementary approach is to conduct horse races with 3 or more
models, which allows us to classify observations into heterogeneous types. One challenge with
this exercise is that – simply by chance – virtually any model will have the best t for some
observations. To be able to interpret the results as reecting heterogeneity in types, we need
to be disciplined in choosing which models to include and to also compare the percentage of
observations t by a given model to the uniform benchmark.
Appendix Table A8 shows the results of this exercise. In Column 1, we compare the
optimal, 1/N , and balance matching models. These are the models that seem plausible based
on economic theory (optimal) or evidence (1/N and balance matching). In column 2, we add
the uniform benchmark to the set of models. In both specications, balance matching has the
best t for half of the observations. Optimal and 1/N capture slightly more than one-fth of
observations when we do not include the uniform benchmark, but perform only marginally
better than the uniform benchmark when it is included.
To the extent that we think of the competing models as actually representing dierent
models of individual decision-making, we would naturally expect the best-t model to be
persistent within individuals over time. Table 5 shows the within-person transition matrix for
the best-t model. The sample is restricted to individual ×months where we observe repayment
behavior for at least two months in a row. For this exercise, we allow the set J to encompass all
of the candidate models, and we x the uniformly distributed repayment to be constant within
individuals over time.
The table shows that balance matching exhibits a high degree of persistence – both in
absolute value and relative to the other models of repayment behavior. Among individuals
whose repayments are best t by the uniform model in a given month, 23.2% make repayments
that are closest to the uniform model in the next month. This persistence likely reects the
fact that balances and repayments are sticky over time: If the uniform model happens to be
accurate in a given month, and balances and payments are sticky, then the uniform model,
code characteristics (such as postal code income and education). We were unable to detect any economically
or statistically signicant correlations. However, we caution against drawing too strong conclusions about
heterogeneity, because we do not know whether postal code characteristics are good proxies for the demographic
characteristics of our sample of individuals.
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which is xed to be constant within an individual over time, will mechanically be accurate in
the next month as well.
The balance-matching model exhibits three-fold greater persistence than the uniform
model. Among individuals whose repayments are closest to balance matching in a particular
month, 83% make payments that are closest to balance matching in the next month. The high
degree of persistence suggests that balance matching is more than a good statistical model
but is actually capturing a stable feature of individual decision-making. The only other model
that exhibits strong persistence is the 1/N rule, which again likely reects that fact that 1/N
repayments (or the tendency to round payments) is a stable feature of individual behavior.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In Appendix C, we present two sets of sensitivity analysis. First, for some credit cards, minimum
payments are set as a proportion of balances. For these cards, balance matching behavior could
instead arise from individuals making payments that are proportional to minimum payments.
We rule out this explanation by showing that the balancing matching result holds among
cards where minimum payments are not proportional to balances. Second, we investigate the
sensitivity of our results to whether the individual uses automatic payment (“autopay”). We
show that autopay is rare in our baseline sample (11%). However, when individuals use autopay,
their propensity to misallocate and to follow a balance-matching rule is similar to that in the
non-autopay sample, suggesting that our results are robust across these somewhat dierent
choice environments.
6.4 Balances and APRs in Machine Learning Models
In addition to providing us with an upper benchmark, the machine learning models allow
us to assess the relative importance of balances and APRs in predicting repayment behavior.
Specically we calculate the variable importance, which can be thought of as the incremental
increase in R2 from adding a given variable to the model. Appendix Table A9 shows that
APRs and balances are not strongly correlated. In cases where the variables are collinear, the
interpretation of variable importance may be spurious (Mullianathan and Spiess, 2017).
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Consistent with the balance matching results, the machine learning models conrm
that balances are hugely important for predicting behavior. Appendix Table A10 shows that
balances have the highest variable importance in all of the models, with importance factors
substantially larger than any of the other explanatory variables. Consistent with the poor
t of the optimal repayment rule, we nd that APRs have the lowest variable importance
across models. Appendix Table A11 shows minima and maxima of variable importance from
models estimated on 10 partitions of the training sample. Unlike some other machine learning
applications (e.g., Mullianathan and Spiess, 2017), the ranges are narrowly spread around the
baseline estimates from Appendix Table A10, indicating that our variable importance measures
are not particularly sensitive to random variation in the training dataset.
Taken together, our goodness-of-t analysis supports the view that balance matching is
a powerful predictor of credit card repayments, capturing more than half of the predictable
variation in repayment behavior and performing substantially better than alternative models.
In the horse race analysis, balance matching performs at a similar level to the machine learning
models, and is highly persistent over time, suggesting it is more than a good statistical model
but is actually capturing a stable feature of individual decision-making.
7 Discussion
The fact that individuals do not repay credit cards optimally, and instead repay in proportion
to balances, has implications for the industrial organization of credit card markets and public
policy. While it is beyond the scope of the paper to rigorously examine these implications, we
provide some initial thoughts below.
To think through the implications for consumer and producer surplus, consider a two-stage
model of credit card market. In stage 1, individuals shop for and select credit cards. In stage
2, individuals spend on and repay their credit cards. The analysis in this paper implies that
conditional on reaching stage 2, individuals do not optimally concentrate their borrowing on
their cheapest card. From the perspective of the issuer, this implies that being the high cost card
in a consumers’ portfolio can generate large stage 2 prots. However, to understand the full
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eect of non-optimal repayments on producer and consumer surplus, we need to understand
how these stage 2 prots aect behavior in stage 1.
One possibility is that rms dissipate their stage 2 prots via competition for an “install
base” of consumers in stage 1. If stage 2 prots lead rms to set very low stage 1 prices (e.g.,
teaser rates) to acquire an install base, then it is theoretically possible for rms to dissipate
all of their stage 2 rents, and for consumer surplus to be similar to what it would be in a
counterfactual scenario where consumers repay their balances optimally (although the timing
of borrowing will still be distorted from the teaser rate). A second possibility is that rms
dissipate some – perhaps most – of their stage 2 prots in acquisition behavior. The large
number of mail solicitations, aggressive new card promotions, and heavy television advertising
in the industry is consistent with this theory. To the extent that much of these acquisition
costs are businesses stealing from rivals, and not category expansion, this expenditure can
be thought of as a deadweight loss. A third possibility is that rms do not dissipate much
of their stage 2 prots in stage 1. This could occur because there are decreasing returns to
acquisition activity (conditional on sending a mail solicitation every week, the marginal return
to an additional mailer might be quite small). Adjudicating between these dierent possibilities
is important but beyond the scope of this paper.
From a policy perspective, a natural response to the observed non-optimality of repayments
is to make interest rates more salient. While Seira et al. (2017) found no eect of interest rate
salience on indebtedness and defaults in their study of Mexican credit card holders, there may
be alternative ways of presenting interest rate information that successfully shift behavior.
A broader policy response is to make it easier for consumers to share credit card data with
third parties, such as FinTech rms.45 In principle, these rms could use these data to help
consumers optimize their repayments across their credit cards, although there is no guarantee
that they will nudge consumers in an optimal direction.
45 For instance, recently implemented Open Banking regulation in the UK requires large banks, at their consumers’
discretion, to give third parties access to account data through secure application programming interfaces (APIs).
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we used linked data on multiple cards from ve major credit card issuers to
study how individuals repay their debt. First, we showed that the allocation of repayments is
highly non-optimal, with individuals allocating only 51.5% of their payments in excess of the
minimum to the high APR card, relative to optimal repayments of 97.1%. These ndings are
almost identical to Ponce et al. (2017), and indicate that the behavior they documented did not
merely reect limited consumer experience with credit cards in the Mexican market.
Second, we showed repayment behavior was inconsistent with models of optimization
frictions. Specically, we showed that degree of misallocation was invariant to the nancial
stakes of the repayment decision, implying that models of optimal inattention with a xed cost
of adjustment could not explain our ndings. We also showed that the degree of misallocation
is invariant to the time since account opening, suggesting that a learning model cannot explain
observed behavior.
The third part of the paper showed that repayment behavior is consistent with a balance-
matching heuristic under which the share of repayments on each card is matched to the share
of balances on each card. In particular, we showed that balance matching captures more than
half of the predictable variation in repayments, performs substantially better than other models,
and is highly persistent within individuals over time. Making repayments in proportion to
balances could arise from broad tendency for humans, and other species, to engage in “matching
behavior” in related choice environments, but could also arise from individuals repaying a
constant percentage of their balances across cards. Unpacking the underlying explanations for
repayment behavior is a fruitful area for future research.
References
Agarwal, S., S. Chomsisengphet, N. Mahoney, and J. Stroebel (2015). Regulating Consumer
Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(1),
111–164.
Agarwal, S., S. Chomsisengphet, N. Mahoney, and J. Stroebel (2018). Do Banks Pass through
Credit Expansions to Consumers Who want to Borrow? The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 133(1), 129–190.
30
Agarwal, S., P. M. Skiba, and J. Tobacman (2009). Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity
and Credit Scoring Puzzles? American Economic Review 99(2), 412–17.
Amar, M., D. Ariely, S. Ayal, C. E. Cryder, and S. I. Rick (2011). Winning the Battle but Losing the
War: The Psychology of Debt Management. Journal of Marketing Research 48(SPL), S38–S50.
Andersen, S., J. Campbell, K. M. Nielsen, and T. Ramadorai (2017). Inattention and Inertia in
Household Finance: Evidence from the Danish Mortgage Market. NBER Working Paper 21386.
Arrow, K. J. (1958). Utilities, Attitudes, Choices: A Review Note. Econometrica 26(1), 1–23.
BBVA (2015). Mexico Banking Outlook. Technical report, BBVA Research.
Behrend, E. and M. Bitterman (1961). Probability-Matching in the Fish. The American Journal
of Psychology 74(4), 542–551.
Benartzi, S. and R. H. Thaler (2001). Naive Diversication Strategies in Dened Contribution
Saving Plans. American Economic Review 91(1), 79–98.
Breiman, L. (2001). Random forests. Machine Learning 45(1), 5–32.
Brown, A. L. and J. N. Lahey (2015). Small Victories: Creating Intrinsic Motivation in Task
Completion and Debt Repayment. Journal of Marketing Research 52(6), 768–783.
Calvo, G. A. (1983). Staggered Prices in A Utility-Maximizing Framework. Journal of Monetary
Economics 12(3), 383–398.
Campbell, J. Y. and J. F. Cocco (2003). Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage
Choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4), 1449–1494.
Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, S. Leth-Petersen, T. H. Nielsen, and T. Olsen (2014). Active vs. Passive
Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(3), 1141–1219.
Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, T. Olsen, and L. Pistaferri (2011). Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses,
and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(2), 749–804.
Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, and J. E. Rocko (2014). Measuring the Impacts of Teachers I:
Evaluating Bias in Teacher Value-Added Estimates. American Economic Review 104(9), 2593–
2632.
DellaVigna, S. (2009). Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field. Journal of Economic
Literature 47 (2), 315–372.
31
FCA (2016). Credit Card Market Study Final Report: Annex 2 Further Analysis. Technical
report, Financial Conduct Authority.
Friedman, J., T. Hastie, and R. Tibshirani (2001). The Elements of Statistical Learning, Volume 1.
Springer Series in Statistics New York.
Friedman, J. H. (2001). Greedy function aproximation: A gradient boosting machine. The Annals
of Statistics 29(5), 1189–1232.
Gal, I. (1996). Understanding Repeated Simple Choices. Thinking & Reasoning 2(1), 81–98.
Gross, D. B. and N. S. Souleles (2002). Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Con-
sumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (1),
149–185.
Herrnstein, R. J. (1961). Relative and absolute strength of response as a function of frequency
of reinforcement. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 4(3), 267–272.
Jacquet, Y. F. (1972). Schedule-Induced Licking During Multiple Schedules. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior 17 (3), 413–423.
Jorring, A. (2018). The Costs of Financial Mistakes: Evidence from US Consumers. Working
Paper .
Keys, B. J., D. G. Pope, and J. C. Pope (2016). Failure to renance. Journal of Financial
Economics 122(3), 482–499.
Keys, B. J. and J. Wang (2018). Minimum Payments and Debt Paydown in Consumer Credit
Cards. Journal of Financial Economics (forthcoming).
Loomes, G. (1998). Probabilities vs money: A test of some fundamental assumptions about
rational decision making. Economic Journal 108(447), 477–489.
Mullianathan, S. and J. Spiess (2017). Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, 87–106.
Navarro-Martinez, D., L. C. Salisbury, K. N. Lemon, N. Stewart, W. J. Matthews, and A. J. L.
Harris (2011). Minimum required payment and supplemental information disclosure eects
on consumer debt repayment decisions. Journal of Marketing Research 48, S60–S77.
Olafsson, A. and M. Pagel (2018). The liquid hand-to-mouth: Evidence from personal nance
management software. The Review of Financial Studies, hhy055.
Ponce, A., E. Seira, and G. Zamarripa (2017). Borrowing on the Wrong Credit Card: Evidence
from Mexico. American Economic Review 107 (4), 1335–1361.
32
Rubinstein, A. (2002). Irrational Diversication in Multiple Decision Problems. European
Economic Review 46(8), 1369–1378.
Saez, E. (2010). Do taxpayers bunch at kink points? American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy 2(3), 180–212.
Seira, E., A. Elizondo, and E. Laguna-Müggenburg (2017). Are Information Disclosures Eective?
Evidence from the Credit Card Market. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9(1),
277–307.
Sims, C. A. (2003). Implications of Rational Inattention. Journal of Monetary Economics 50(3),
665–690.
Skinner, C. H., S. L. Robinson, G. A. Johns, P. Logan, and P. J. Belore (1996). Applying
Herrnstein’s Matching Law to Inuence Students’ Choice to Complete Dicult Academic
Tasks. The Journal of Experimental Education 65(1), 5–17.
Stewart, N. (2009). The cost of anchoring on credit card minimum payments. Psychological
Science 20, 39–41.
Taubinsky, D., A. Rees-Jones, et al. (2018). Attention Variation and Welfare: Theory and Evidence
from a Tax Salience Experiment. Review of Economic Studies (forthcoming).
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Science 185(4157), 1124–1131.
UK Cards (2013). UK Plastic Cards 2013. Technical report, The UK Cards Association.
UK Cards Association (2017). UK Card Payments. Technical report.
Vulkan, N. (2000). An Economist’s Perspective on Probability Matching. Journal of Economic
Surveys 14(1), 101–118.
33
Figure 1: Actual and Optimal Payments
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Note: Panel A shows the distribution of actual and optimal payments on the high interest rate card in the two-card
sample. Panels B to D show radar plots of mean actual and optimal payments in the samples with 3 to 5 cards.
In the radar plots, cards are ordered clockwise from the highest to the lowest APR (starting at the rst node
clockwise from noon). All samples are restricted to individual ×months in which individuals face an economically
meaningful allocative decision. Sample sizes in Panel A: 394,111; Panel B: 264,420; Panel C: 83,880; Panel D:
19,120. See Section 2.2 for details on the sample construction.
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Figure 2: Misallocated Payments by Economic Stakes
(A) Misallocated vs. Dierence in APR
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(B) Misallocated vs. Total Payments
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(C) Misallocated vs. ∆ APR × Total Payment
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
M
is
al
lo
ca
te
d 
P
ay
m
en
ts
 (
%
)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Difference in APR x Total Payment (£)
Note: Figure shows binned-scatter plots (with 20 equally sized bins) of misallocated payments against the
dierence in APR across cards (Plot A), the total value of payments within the month in pounds (Plot B) and
the dierence in APR multiplied by the total value of payments within the month (Plot C). Local polynomial
lines of best t, based on the non-binned data, are also shown. The two-card sample is restricted to individual ×
months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for details on
the sample construction.
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Figure 3: Misallocated Payments by Card Age and Dierence in Due Dates
(A) Misallocated vs. Age of High-APR Card
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(B) Misallocated Payments vs. Di. Due Dates
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Note: Figure shows binned-scatter plots (with 20 equally sized bins) of misallocated payments against the
dierence in payment due dates (Plot A) and age of the high APR card (Plot B). Local polynomial lines of best
t, based on the non-binned data, are also shown. The two-card sample is restricted to individual × months in
which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for details on the sample
construction.
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Figure 4: Rounding and the 1/N Rule
(A) Density of Payments (£s)
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Note: Panel A shows the distribution of payments on the high APR card in £s (excluding the top decile of
payments). Panel B plots the distribution of payments on the high APR card in percent, among individuals who
make round number payments (exact multiples of £50). Panel C plots the distribution of payments on the high
APR in percent, among individuals who make non-round number payments (not multiples of £50). The round and
non-round samples are dened by repayments on the high APR card. See Footnote 35 for details. The two-card
sample is restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative
decision. See Section 2.2 for details on the sample construction.
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Figure 5: Balance Matching
(A) Baseline Sample
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Note: Left panels shows the distribution of actual and balance-matching payments on the high APR card. Right
panels show the joint density of actual and balance-matching payments. Panel A shows the baseline sample,
Panel B restricts the sample to non-round payment amounts (not multiples of £50). Round and non-round samples
are dened by repayments on the high APR card. See Footnote 35 for details. The two-card sample is restricted
to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2
for details on the sample construction.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Actual and Balance-Matching Payments on Multiple Cards
(A) Three Cards
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Note: Left column shows the marginal distributions of actual and balance-matching payments on the high APR
card. Right column shows radar plots of the mean percentage of actual and balance-matching payments allocated
to each card. In the radar plots, cards are ordered clockwise from the highest to the lowest balance (starting at
the rst node clockwise from noon). All samples are restricted to individual × months in which individuals face
an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for details on the sample construction.
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Figure 7: Goodness-of-Fit for Dierent Models
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Note: Goodness-of-t for dierent models of the percentage of payments on the high APR card. The left panel shows the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), the middle panel
shows the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), and the right panel shows the Pearson Correlation Coecient, which can also be interpreted as the square root of the R-squared.
Random has repayments on the high APR card randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with support on the 0% to 100% interval. Optimal is pay minimum required
payment on all of their cards, repay as much as possible on the card with the highest interest rate, and only allocate further payments to the lower interest rate cards if they
are able to pay o the highest interest rate card in full. Heuristic 1 is repay the card with the lowest capacity. Heuristic 2 is repay the card with the highest capacity. Heuristic 3
is repay the card with the highest balance. Heuristic 4 is repay the card with the lowest balance (“debt snowball method”). Balance matching is match the share of repayments
on each card to the share of balances on each card. Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Gradient Boost are machine learning models that predict the share of repayments on the
high APR card using these methods. The two-card sample is restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision.
Goodness of t is calculated using the 20% hold-out sample. See Section 2.2 for details on the sample construction.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
High APR Card Low APR Card Dierence
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Card Characteristics
APR: Purchases (%) 22.87 4.80 16.56 6.40 6.30 5.85
APR: Cash Advances (%) 26.08 4.12 23.72 5.28 2.36 6.31
Monthly Credit Limit (£) 6,388.77 4,443.05 6,013.20 4,092.41 375.57 4,856.48
Spending (£)
Purchases 128.09 432.43 116.53 397.63 11.56 570.04
Purchases if > £0 380.17 672.79 360.06 629.70 -2.80 798.02
Cash Advances 6.47 73.29 5.81 73.74 0.66 97.25
Cash Advances if > £0 216.98 366.68 215.01 395.20 -5.42 352.15
Payments (£)
Repayments 259.76 733.92 229.69 657.60 30.07 913.65
Interest Paid (£)
Purchases 38.48 59.49 28.97 48.32 9.51 61.64
Cash Advances 1.49 10.73 0.91 7.13 0.58 11.88
Card Cycle (£)
Closing Balance 3,020.54 3,115.48 3,032.15 2,967.13 -11.61 3,478.14
Revolving Balance 2,200.01 2,890.49 2,053.68 2,796.17 146.33 3,082.07
Minimum Amount Due 63.24 68.84 56.80 58.32 6.43 71.55
Card Status
Predicted Account Charge-O Rate (%) 1.80 3.03 1.65 2.56 0.13 3.11
Tenure (Months Since Account Opened) 104.82 78.13 78.53 70.10 26.30 84.55
Number of Account-Months 394,111 394,111 394,111
Note: Summary statistics for the two-card sample restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an
economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for more details on the sample construction. APR
stands for annual percentage rate. Predicted charge-o rate is the predicted probability that the credit card is
charged o within the next six months. The exchange rate was £1 = $1.32 at the midpoint of our sample period.
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Table 2: Actual Payments and Optimal Payments, Interest Savings from Optimizing
Panel (A)
Actual and Optimal Payments on the High APR Card
Percentiles
Mean Std. Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
i) As % Total Monthly Payment
Actual Payment (%) 51.22 24.21 16.86 33.33 50.00 67.99 84.78
Optimal Payment (%) 70.74 22.17 38.10 55.92 75.23 89.48 95.83
Dierence (%) 19.52 23.75 0.00 0.72 9.91 32.40 54.55
ii) Payment in £
Actual Payment (£) 259.76 733.92 25.00 45.49 100.00 200.00 450.00
Optimal Payment (£) 377.30 849.70 32.62 65.00 138.51 307.09 807.21
Dierence (£) 117.54 422.14 0.00 1.00 17.80 75.00 237.47
Panel (B)
Annualized Interest Savings from Optimizing Credit Card Repayments
Percentiles
Mean Std. Dev. 75th 90th
Two Cards 64.82 115.33 70.39 167.41
Three Cards 121.26 463.63 133.44 414.36
Four Cards 198.40 665.57 262.80 703.68
Five Cards 247.65 851.83 366.96 926.88
Note: Panel A shows summary statistics for actual and optimal payments on the high APR card. The top panel
shows values as a percentage of total payments on both cards in that month. The bottom panel shows values in £s.
N= = 394,111. Percentiles and other summary statistics are taken with respect to individual ×month observations.
Panel B shows summary statistics for annualized interest savings from a counterfactual “steady state” where
individuals optimize balances across the credit cards we observe in our data, subject to the constraint of not
exceeding their credit limits. The two-card sample has N= 394,111, the three-card sample has N= 264,420, the
four card sample has N= 83,880, and the ve-card sample has N=19,120. In both panels, the sample is restricted
to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2
for more details on the sample construction. The exchange rate was £1 = $1.32 at the midpoint of our sample
period.
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Table 3: Actual and Optimal Payments on High APR Card by
Quintiles of Economic Stakes and Card Age
Quintiles of i - v
1 2 3 4 5
i) Dierence in APR
Dierence in APR (%) 0.81 2.03 3.78 6.44 14.98
Actual Payment (%) 49.79 50.27 50.98 51.86 53.19
Optimal Payment (%) 71.12 70.78 70.34 70.17 71.26
Dierence (%) 21.33 20.51 19.36 18.32 18.07
ii) Total Payment
Total Payment (£) 63.82 125.98 204.23 350.22 1658.91
Actual Payment (%) 49.70 50.09 51.04 52.62 52.64
Optimal Payment (%) 60.47 66.89 70.04 74.19 81.80
Dierence (%) 10.78 16.80 19.00 21.56 29.16
iii) Financial Stakes
Financial Stakes (£) 1.20 3.70 8.08 17.50 101.91
Actual Payment (%) 49.79 50.19 50.20 51.49 54.42
Optimal Payment (%) 64.67 68.13 68.92 72.20 79.75
Dierence (%) 14.88 17.94 18.71 20.72 25.33
iv) Dierence in Due Dates
Dierence in Due Dates (Days) 1.03 3.48 6.48 10.83 17.93
Actual Payment (%) 50.83 51.38 51.39 51.30 51.21
Optimal Payment (%) 70.07 70.71 70.65 70.99 71.20
Dierence (%) 19.25 19.33 19.27 19.69 20.00
v) Age of High APR Card
Age of High APR Card (Months) 3.82 5.57 7.50 9.50 11.48
Actual Payment (%) 43.58 43.54 43.65 43.31 43.96
Optimal Payment (%) 72.94 72.83 72.49 71.62 71.44
Dierence (%) 29.36 29.29 28.84 28.31 27.48
Note: Summary statistics for actual and optimal payments on the high APR card
by quintiles of economic stakes and card age. Cells report mean values within the
quintile. The sample is restricted to individual × months in which individuals face
an economically meaningful allocative decision. N = 394,111. See Section 2.2 for
more details on the sample construction. The exchange rate was £1 = $1.32 at the
midpoint of our sample period.
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Table 4: Horse Races Between Alternative Models
Panel (A): Uniform vs. Other Rules
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Win %
Uniform 32.87 46.66 45.53 50.32 45.44 47.48 47.09 31.01 23.55 27.14
Balance Matching 67.13
1/N 53.34
Optimal 54.47
Heuristic 1 (Pay Down Lowest Capacity) 49.68
Heuristic 2 (Pay Down Highest Capacity) 54.56
Heuristic 3 (Pay Down Highest Balance) 52.52
Heuristic 4 (Pay Down Lowest Balance) 52.91
Decision Tree 68.99
Random Forest 76.45
XGB 72.86
Panel (B): Balance Matching vs. Other Rules
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Win %
Balance Matching 60.90 68.97 73.09 67.22 76.65 64.70 50.02 40.87 45.55
1/N 39.10
Optimal 31.03
Heuristic 1 (Pay Down Lowest Capacity) 26.91
Heuristic 2 (Pay Down Highest Capacity) 32.78
Heuristic 3 (Pay Down Highest Balance) 23.35
Heuristic 4 (Pay Down Lowest Balance) 35.30
Decision Tree 49.98
Random Forest 59.13
XGB 54.45
Note: Table shows percentage of individual×month observations that are best t by dierent models of repayment
behavior. The target variable is the share of repayments on the high APR card. Panel A compares each of our
models one-by-one against the lower benchmark where the percentage of repayments on the high APR card is
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with support on the 0% to 100% interval. Panel B compares each
of the models one-by-one to the balance-matching model. We exclude a comparison of balance matching and
the uniform model, since it was shown in Panel A. Uniform has repayments on the high APR card randomly
drawn from a uniform distribution with support on the 0% to 100% interval. Balance matching is match the
share of repayments on each card to the share of balances on each card. Optimal is pay minimum required
payment on all of their cards, repay as much as possible on the card with the highest interest rate, and only
allocate further payments to the lower interest rate cards if they are able to pay o the highest interest rate
card in full. Heuristic 1 is repay the card with the lowest capacity. Heuristic 2 is repay the card with highest
capacity. Heuristic 3 is repay the card with the highest balance. Heuristic 4 is repay the card with the lowest
balance (“debt snowball method”). Decision Tree, Random Forest, and XGB are machine learning models that
predict the share of repayments on the high APR card using these methods. Samples are restricted to individual
× months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. All results shown in the
table are based on the 20% hold-out sample. See Section 2.2 for more details on the sample construction.
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Table 5: Transition Matrix for Best-Fit Model
P
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
P
e
r
i
o
d
Current Period
Balance
Uniform Matching Optimal H 1 H 2 H 3 H 4 1/N Rule
Uniform 23.18% 56.71% 0.24% 1.53% 0.35% 2.24% 0.59% 15.18%
Balance Matching 8.24% 83.06% 0.13% 1.37% 1.18% 1.07% 1.13% 3.82%
Optimal 9.09% 81.82% 9.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Heuristic 1 (Pay Down Lowest Capacity) 7.98% 49.08% 0.00% 28.22% 0.00% 1.84% 4.91% 7.98%
Heuristic 2 (Pay Down Highest Capacity) 4.27% 66.67% 0.00% 0.85% 24.79% 1.71% 0.00% 1.71%
Heuristic 3 (Pay Down Highest Balance) 10.28% 47.66% 0.93% 4.67% 0.93% 17.76% 0.00% 17.76%
Heuristic 4 (Pay Down Lowest Balance) 11.59% 57.97% 0.00% 4.35% 0.00% 1.45% 20.29% 4.35%
1/N Rule 18.99% 27.89% 0.13% 2.39% 0.40% 1.33% 0.27% 48.61%
Note: Table shows transition matrix for the best-t payment model. The target variable is the share of repayments on the high APR card. In each period, we allow the set J to
encompass all of the candidate models, and we x the uniformly distributed repayment to be constant within an individual over time. Balance matching is match the share of
repayments on each card to the share of balances on each card. Optimal is to pay minimum required payment on all of their cards, repay as much as possible on the card with
the highest interest rate, and only allocate further payments to the lower interest rate cards if they are able to pay o the highest interest rate card in full. Heuristic 1 is repay
the card with the lowest capacity. Heuristic 2 is repay the card with highest capacity. Heuristic 3 is repay the card with the highest balance. Heuristic 4 is repay the card
with the lowest balance (“debt snowball method”). 1/N is exactly split repayments across cards. Samples are restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an
economically meaningful allocative decision. All results shown in the table are based on the 20% hold-out sample. See Section 2.2 for more details on the sample construction.
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Online Appendix
A Machine Learning Models
This section provides details of machine learning models we use to t repayment behavior. We
estimate decision tree, random forest and extreme gradient boosting. For all of these models,
our target variable is the percentage of payments allocated to the high APR card in the two-card
sample. We use APRs, balances, and credit limits on both cards as explanatory variables, and
tune the models with cross-validation to maximize the out-of-sample power.
Decision Tree Tree-based methods partition the sample space into a series of hyper-cubes,
and then t a simple model in each partition. The decision tree is grown through iteratively
partitioning nodes into two sub-nodes according to a splitting rule. In our case, the splitting
criterion is to nd one explanatory variable and a cut-o value that minimize the sum of
squared errors in the two sub-nodes combined. In theory, the tree can have one observation
in each nal node, but this tree will have poor performance out-of-sample. In practice, the
decision tree is grown until the reduction in squared error falls under some threshold. Then, it
calculates the average percentage of payments allocated to high APR cards in each nal node.
We use the r package “rpart” to t the decision-tree model.46 To avoid overtting the data,
we “prune” the decision tree by tuning the complexity parameter through cross-validation.
The complexity parameter requires each split to achieve a gain in R-squared greater than the
parameter value. We pick the complexity parameter threshold that minimizes mean square
error in 5-fold cross-validation. That is, we split the sample randomly into 5 disjoint subsets.
For each of these 5 subsets, we use the remaining 80% of the data to train the tree, and calculate
the error on each 20% subset.47 Appendix Figure A9 shows the estimated decision tree.
Random Forest The machine learning literature has proposed several variations on the tree
model. One approach which has been found to work very well in practice is random forest
46 See https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/rpart/vignettes/longintro.pdf for a com-
plete description of the function.
47 See Friedman et al. (2001) Chapter 9, for further information on tree-based methods.
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(Breiman, 2001). Random forest builds a large number of trees and averages their predictions.
It introduces randomness into the set of explanatory variables considered when splitting each
node. The algorithm rst draws a number of bootstrapped samples, and grows a decision tree
within each sample. At each node, it randomly selects a subset of “m” explanatory variables
in the split search, and chooses the best split among those “m” variables. Lastly, it makes
predictions by averaging the results from each tree.
We use the r package “randomForest” to grow a forest of 100 trees.48 For each tree, we
calculate the out-of-sample error using the rest of the data not included in the bootstrapped
sample. The average prediction error over these 100 trees is minimized to ne tune “m,” the
number of explanatory variables in the subset we consider in each split search. Increasing the
number of trees does not signicantly improve prediction accuracy.
Extreme Gradient Boosting Extreme gradient boosting and random forest are both based
on a collection of tree predictors. They dier in their training algorithm. The motivation for
boosting is a procedure that combines the outputs of many “weak” classiers to produce a pow-
erful “committee” (Friedman et al., 2001). Instead of growing a number of trees independently,
boosting applies an additive training strategy, by adding one new tree at a time. At each step,
the new decision tree puts greater weights on observations that are misclassied in the previous
iteration. Finally, it averages predictions from trees at each step. This algorithm eectively
gives greater inuence to the more accurate tree models in the additive sequence. We use the r
package “xgboost” and ne tune the number of iterations over a 5-fold cross-validation.49 The
rest of the parameters such as the learning rate are kept at their default values. Perturbation of
these values does not have material impact on out-of-sample errors.50
48 See https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/randomForest/randomForest.pdf for a com-
plete description of the function.
49 See http://cran.fhcrc.org/web/packages/xgboost/vignettes/xgboost.pdf for a complete de-
scription of the function.
50 For a more detailed introduction of extreme gradient boosting, see http://xgboost.readthedocs.io/en/
latest/model.html. Friedman (2001) is the rst paper that introduced the term “gradient boosting.” Friedman
et al. (2001), Chapter 10 also introduces a boosting algorithm.
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B Costs of Misallocation: Extensions
In the main text, we presented the annualized interest savings from a counterfactual “steady
state” where individuals optimize balances across the credit cards we observe in our data,
subject to the constraint of not exceeding their credit limits. In this section, we present two
extensions of these baseline calculations, focusing on the two card sample for tractability.
First, in Table A3 we present interest savings calculated using the baseline steady state
approach for observations that were excluded from our baseline sample. The top row reproduces
the estimates for the baseline two-card sample, also show in Panel B of Table 2. The subsequent
rows show savings for observations excluded by dierent sample restrictions. The interest
savings are roughly one-third as large for individuals who are excluded for paying the minimum
on both cards and comparable for observations where individuals are revolving on one card
only. The interest savings are zero for observations that are excluded because the individual
pays both cards in full, has equal interest rates, or does not carry a revolving balance. These
individuals are not borrowing, so there is no borrowing to optimize. Total savings, which
combine positive savings for borrowers and zero savings for non-borrowers, are shown in the
nal row. Average interest savings for this sample are roughly one-third those in the baseline
sample.
Second, we show interest savings from exercise where counterfactual interest costs are
determined by simulating forward outcomes when individuals optimally repay their credit
cards over time. This simulation is supposed to measure the gains from “learning” the optimal
repayment rule, which the individual can then implement over time, and incrementally shift
their balances across cards.
An important complication with applying this alternative model is that we have to take a
stand on counterfactual spending behavior. Assuming their spending “stays the same” is not
an option: With the updated repayments, some individuals will go over their credit limits on
the lower APR card. One option is to assume that individuals allocate their spending optimally.
The optimal allocation of spending is achieved by prioritizing spending to the low APR card,
allocating spending only to the high APR card once the credit limit of the low APR card is
reached. If you told someone how to repay optimally, a good guess is that they would also
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adjust their spending towards the optimal allocation (although we agree that they might not
get all the way to optimal). Another option is to assume that they hold their spending xed,
unless they bump into a credit limit, in which case we can reallocate their spending to the other
card. We show counterfactual interest payments under both of these assumptions for spending
behavior.
We implement these calculations on our two-card sample. To capture the counterfactual
where individuals learn about optimal spending and incrementally shift their balances over
time, we need to observe individuals without gaps for multiple months. To create a balanced
panel, we draw a sample of individuals who enter the individual × month sample restrictions
in at least one month of the data and then remain in the data for at least 11 subsequent months
(with those months either inside or out of the sample restrictions). This sample therefore diers
from the baseline pooled sample of observations.
Table A12 shows summary statistics for interest savings. The top panel shows savings
when optimizing both payments and spending, the bottom panel shows savings from optimizing
payments only. Interest savings in both versions of the dynamic optimal model are weakly
positive. When individuals optimize both payments and spending (Panel A), mean annualized
interest savings at 12 months are close to those from the steady state calculation (£58 versus
£65) and the percentiles of the distribution are also similar. When individuals only optimize
payments, balances take longer to converge to the steady state optimal allocation, and at a 12
months time horizon savings are one-third lower than savings when individuals optimize on
both margins.
C Sensitivity Analysis
C.1 Minimum Payment Matching
An alternative explanation for the balance-matching result is that individuals anchor their
payments to minimum payment amounts. Like balances, minimum payments are prominently
displayed on credit card statements (see Figure A5). If repayments are determined by a minimum-
payment-matching heuristic, and minimum payments are proportional to balances, then mini-
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mum payment matching could produce the observed repayment behavior.51
We separately identify balance matching from minimum payment matching by “zooming
in” on a subset of observations where predicted payments under balance matching and minimum
payment matching are very dierent. This approach is better than including minimum payment
matching as another heuristic in the goodness-of-t analysis. If the balance-matching and
minimum-payment-matching amounts were largely overlapping, both heuristics would have
similar goodness-of-t, even if repayments were driven by only one model of behavior.
To understand how we separately identify these two explanations, we need to provide
some background on minimum payment formulas. Most minimum payment amounts are
calculated as the maxim of a xed amount and a percentage of the balance. For instance, a
typical minimum payment formula might be:
Minimum Payment = max{£25, 2% × Balance}.
Consider the following scenarios for an individual with two cards:
(i) If minimum payments are on the “xed” part of the formula (balances greater than £1,250),
and the percentages are identical (2% for both cards), then the balance-matching and
minimum-payment-matching payments will be almost perfectly correlated.52
(ii) If the percentages dier, then balance-matching and minimum-payment-matching pay-
ments will be correlated, but to a lesser extent.
(iii) If minimum payments are on the “percentage” part of the formula (balances less than
£1,250), then the balance-matching allocation will not be correlated with the minimum-
payment-matching allocation.
Hence, focusing on observations that have dierent percentages in the minimum payment rule
(scenario ii) and where the xed payment binds (scenario iii) allows us to separately identify
these mechanisms.
Figure A10 shows binned-scatter plots of actual and predicted payments on the high
51 Setting payments at multiples of the minimum amount (e.g., twice the minimum on each card) would also produce
the observed repayment behavior.
52 The correlation is not perfect because minimum payment amounts may include fees incurred during the cycle,
such as cash advance fees or foreign currency exchange fees.
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interest rate card under the balance-matching heuristic (left column) and minimum-payment-
matching heuristic (right column). The top row shows this relationship where both cards have
the same percentage (scenario i), the middle row shows this relationship when the percentages
are dierent (scenario ii), and the bottom row shows this relationship when both cards are on
the xed part of the formula (scenario iii). The correlations between these dierent measures
are shown in Table A13.
In the same percentage sample, the balance-matching and the minimum-payment-matching
payments are near-perfectly correlated (ρ = 0.96). As a result, the correlation between actual
and balance-matching payments (ρ = 0.63) is nearly identical to the correlation between
actual and minimum-payment-matching payments (ρ = 0.61). In the dierent percentages
sample, the balance-matching and the minimum-payment-matching payments are more weakly
correlated (ρ = 0.86), and the correlation between actual and balance-matching payments
(ρ = 0.41) is stronger than the correlation between actual and minimum-payment-matching
payments (ρ = 0.28). In the xed sample, there is a much weaker correlation between the
balance-matching payments and the minimum-payment-matching payments (ρ = 0.56), and
the correlation between actual and balance-matching payments (ρ = 0.50) is substantially
stronger than the correlation between actual and minimum-payment-matching payments
(ρ = 0.23).
It follows that observed repayment behavior is driven by balance matching and not by
individuals setting payments in relationship to minimum payments. The correlation between
actual and balance-matching payments is not aected by whether minimum-payment-matching
payments are correlated with the balance-matching payment amount. On the other hand, the
correlation between actual and minimum-payment-matching payment seems highly sensitive to
whether the balance-matching payments are correlated with the minimum-payment-matching
amount. We note that while minimum payments do not seem to be driving our ndings, our
analysis does not imply that minimum payments are irrelevant for repayment behavior. Indeed,
while not directly comparable, our nding of a modest correlation between actual and minimum
payments matching repayments is consistent with Keys and Wang (2018), who estimate that
9% to 20% of account-holders anchor their repayments to minimum payment amounts.
51
C.2 Autopay
Another factor that might aect repayment behavior is whether the individual uses automatic
payment (“autopay”). In the completely unrestricted two-card sample (including individuals
with no revolving debt on either card), autopay is used on 23.9% of account ×months. Although
individuals are allowed to set automatic payments at a xed amount or a xed percentage of
the balance, individuals typically set automatic payments at either the minimum due or the full
balance. Conditional on using autopay, 30.3% pay the minimum and 42.2% pay the full amount.
Since we drop individuals who make the minimum or full payment on both their cards (see
Section 2), autopay is used on only 17.4% of account × months in the baseline sample. Thus,
the main results predominately reect behavior when individuals do not use autopay and make
active repayment decisions.
Appendix Figure A11 plots repayment behavior for observations where individuals use
autopay on both cards (left column, 11% of observations) and do not use autopay on either card
(right column, 77% of observations).53 The top row shows the distributions of actual and optimal
payments, the middle row shows the distribution of actual and optimal payments in excess of
the minimum, and the bottom row shows the joint distribution of actual and balance-matching
payments. While average misallocated repayments are lower in the autopay sample than the
non-autopay sample (7.3% versus 23.2%), misallocated repayments in excess of the minimum
are similar in both samples (45.5% versus 45.7%). The reason that misallocated payments are
smaller (and misallocated excess payments are the same) is that the autopay sample has lower
monthly repayments and, therefore, the scope for misallocating payments is lower.54 Summary
statistics for actual and excess payments by autopay status are shown in Appendix Table A14.
Appendix Table A15 and Table A16 show our standard measures of model performance
by whether individuals use autopay on both cards and do not use autopay on either card.55
In particular, Appendix Table A15 shows our measures of goodness-of-t (root mean square
53 The propensity to use autopay is highly correlated within individuals across cards. In the two-card sample, 68.2%
of individuals use autopay on the high APR card also use it on the low APR card, and 74.9% of individuals who do
not use autopay on the high APR card do not use it on the low APR card.
54 Specically, while balances are slightly higher in the autopay sample (£6,900 versus £5,800), repayments are
substantially lower (£200 versus £510).
55 Results are shown using the 20% hold-out sample.
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error, mean absolute error, Pearson’s correlation) for uniformly distributed repayments, optimal
repayments, and balance-matching repayments separately for the autopay and non-autopay
samples. Appendix Table A16 shows the results of horse-race analysis that compares uniformly
distributed versus balance-matching payments, and balance-matching versus optimal repay-
ments, separately for the autopay and non-autopay samples. While the exact results vary, the
optimal model performs poorly and the balance-matching model performs well across all of
these dierent measures of model performance in both the autopay and non-autopay sample.
Thus, we conclude that our results are not particularly sensitive to whether individuals use
autopay.
In summary, autopay is rare in our baseline sample, and our main results predominately
reect repayments by individuals who do not use autopay and necessarily make active re-
payment decisions each month. However, when individuals use autopay, their propensity to
misallocate and to follow a balance-matching rule is similar to that in the non-autopay sample,
suggesting that our results are robust across these somewhat dierent choice environments.
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Figure A1: Actual and Optimal Excess Payments
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Note: Panel A shows the distribution of actual and optimal excess payments on the high interest rate card in the
two-card sample. Panels B to D show radar plots of mean actual and optimal excess payments in the samples of
individuals with 3 to 5 cards. Excess payments are calculated as the percentage of payments on a given card
after subtracting out repayments needed to pay the minimum amounts due. In the radar plots, cards are ordered
clockwise from the highest to the lowest APR (starting at the rst node clockwise from noon). All samples are
restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See
Section 2.2 for more details on the sample construction.
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Figure A2: Misallocated Excess Payments by Economics Stakes
(A) Misallocated vs. Dierence in APR
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(B) Misallocated vs. Total Payments
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(C) Misallocated vs. ∆ APR × Total Payment
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Note: Figure shows binned-scatter plots (with 20 equally sized bins) of misallocated payments in excess of the
minimum payment against the dierence in APR across cards (Plot A), the total value of payments within the
month in pounds (Plot B) and the dierence in APR multiplied by the total value of payments within the month
(Plot C). Local polynomial lines of best t, based on the non-binned data, are also shown. The two-card sample is
restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See
Section 2.2 for details on the sample construction.
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Figure A3: Misallocated Excess Payments by Card Age and Dierence in Due Dates
(A) Misallocated vs. Age of High-APR Card
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(B) Excess Misallocated Payments vs. Di. Due Dates
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Note: Figure shows binned-scatter plots (with 20 equally sized bins) of misallocated payments in excess of the
minimum payment against the dierence in payment due dates (Plot A) and age of the high APR card (Plot
B). Local polynomial lines of best t, based on the non-binned data, are also shown. The two-card sample is
restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See
Section 2.2 for details on the sample construction.
56
Figure A4: Histogram of Dierence in Due Dates
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Note: Figure shows the distribution of the absolute dierence in due dates. The two-card sample is restricted to
individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2
for more details on the sample construction.
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Figure A5: Example Credit Card Statement
Note: The gure shows an extract of one of the authors’ credit card statements, with card issuer branding, contact
details and card holder personal identifying information obscured.
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Figure A6: Balance Matching
(A) Round Number Payment Sample
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Note: Left panels shows the distribution of actual and balance-matching payments on the high APR card. Sample
restricted to round number payments (multiples of £50) Round and non-round samples are dened by repayments
on the high APR card. See Footnote 35 for details. The two-card sample is restricted to individual × months in
which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for details on the sample
construction.
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Figure A7: Goodness-of-Fit for Dierent Models, Round and Non-Round Number Samples
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Note: Goodness-of-t for dierent models of the percentage of payments on the high APR card. The left panel shows the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), the middle panel
shows the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), and right panel shows the Pearson Correlation Coecient, which can also be interpreted as the square root of the R-squared. The
round number sample restricts to observations where individuals make round number payments (multiples of £50), and the non-round number sample restricts to observations
where individuals make non-round payment amounts (not multiples of £50). Random has repayments on the high APR card randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with
support on the 0% to 100% interval. Optimal is pay minimum required payment on all of their cards, repay as much as possible on the card with the highest interest rate, and
only allocate further payments to the lower interest rate cards if they are able to pay o the highest interest rate card in full. Heuristic 1 is repay the card with the lowest
capacity. Heuristic 2 is repay the card with highest capacity. Heuristic 3 is repay the card with the highest balance. Heuristic 4 is repay the card with the lowest balance (“debt
snowball method”). Balance matching is match the share of repayments on each card to the share of balances on each card. Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Gradient Boost
are machine learning models that predict the share of repayments on the high APR card using these methods. Round and non-round samples are dened by repayments on the
high APR card. See Footnote 35 for details. The two-card sample is restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision.
Goodness of t is calculated using the 20% hold-out sample. See Section 2.2 for more details on the sample construction.
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Figure A8: Actual and Predicted Payments Under Alternative Repayment Heuristics
(A) Heuristic 1: Pay Down Lowest Capacity
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Note: Figures show the distributions of actual payments and predict payments under the alternative repayment
heuristics. Heuristic 1 is repay the card with the lowest capacity. Heuristic 2 is repay the card with highest
capacity. Heuristic 3 is repay the card with the highest balance. Heuristic 4 is repay the card with the lowest
balance (“debt snowball method”). The two-card sample is restricted to individual × months in which individuals
face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for more details on the sample construction.
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Figure A9: High APR Card Payment Decision Tree
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Note: Figure shows the decision (regression) tree for high APR card repayment. Top row is tree root. Nodes show the variable and split value at each branch. Bottom rows
show predicted values at the end of each branch.
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Figure A10: Balance Matching and Minimum Payment Matching in the Percentage and Fixed
Payment Samples
(A) Same Percentage Sample
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(B) Dierent Percentage Sample
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(C) Fixed Payment Sample
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Note: Panels show binned-scatter plots of the actual percentage of monthly payment allocated to the high APR
card (y-axis) and the percentage of total monthly payment allocated to the high APR card under the balance-
matching heuristic (x-axis, left column) and minimum-payment-matching heuristics (x-axis, right column). “Same
Percentage Sample” focuses on account ×months where the balance-matching and minimum-payment-matching
payments are near-perfectly correlated (ρ = 0.96). “Dierent Percentage Sample” focuses on account × months
where the balance-matching and minimum-payment-matching payments are less strongly correlated (ρ = 0.86).
“Fixed Payment Sample” focuses of account × months where the balance-matching and minimum-payment-
matching payments have the weakest correlation (ρ = 0.56).
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Figure A11: Actual, Optimal and Balance Matching Payments for Autopay (Left Column, 11%
of Observations) and Non-Autopay (Right Column, 77% of Observations) Samples
(A) Actual vs. Optimal Payments
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(B) Actual vs. Optimal Excess Payments
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(C) Actual vs. Balance Matching Payments
Note: Panel A shows the distribution of actual and optimal excess payments on the high APR card in the two-card
sample. Panel B shows the distribution of actual and optimal excess payments on the high APR card in the two-
card sample. Excess payments are calculated as the percentage of payments on a given card after subtracting out
repayments needed to pay the minimum amounts due. Panel C shows the joint distribution of actual and balance
matching payments on the high APR card. The autopay sample is dened as observations where individuals
make automatic payments on both cards. The non-autopay sample is dened as observations where individuals
do not make automatic payments on either card. All samples are restricted to individual × months in which
individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for more details on the sample
construction.
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Table A1: Sample Restrictions
(1) (2)
Unique Aggregate
Individuals Revolving Debt
Count % £s %
Unrestricted Sample 174,686 100.00% 301,182,890 100.00%
Drop if Equal Interest Rates 2,845 1.63% 6,293,817 2.09%
Drop if Pays Full on Both 10,782 6.17% 18,239,430 6.06%
Drop if Pays Min on Both 48,263 27.63% 50,590,569 16.80%
Baseline Sample 112,796 64.57% 226,059,074 75.06%
Note: Table shows the eect of the sample restrictions on the number and per-
centage of unique individuals and aggregate debt in the two-card sample. Since
observations may be excluded by multiple criteria, the order in which the re-
strictions are applied matters, and the values in the table should be thought
about as the incremental eect of the dierent restrictions.
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Table A2: Actual and Optimal Excess Payments on the High APR Card
Percentiles
Mean Std. Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
i) As a % Total Monthly Payment
Actual Excess Payment (%) 51.51 34.75 0.89 19.92 51.31 84.91 99.82
Optimal Excess Payment (%) 97.08 12.93 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Dierence (%) 45.56 35.05 0.00 11.40 45.34 75.70 98.39
ii) Payments in £
Actual Excess Payment (£) 196.52 729.43 0.23 2.32 22.70 88.79 350.19
Optimal Excess Payment (£) 314.06 843.53 1.91 14.40 66.51 223.00 737.54
Dierence (£) 117.54 422.14 0.00 1.00 17.80 75.00 237.47
Note: Summary statistics for actual and optimal excess payments on the high APR card. Excess pay-
ments are calculated as the percentage of payments on a given card after subtracting out repayments
needed to pay the minimum amounts due. The top panel shows values as a percentage of total excess
payments on both cards in that month. The bottom panel shows values in £s. The two-card sample
is restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative
decision. See Section 2.2 for details.
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Table A3: Annualized Interest Savings in the Unrestricted Sample
Individuals Revolving Debt Interest Savings in £
(N) £ Mean Std. Dev. 75th Pctile 90th Pctile
Baseline sample 112,796 226,059,074 64.19 111.01 68.71 166.97
Pays min on both 48,263 50,590,569 21.93 49.16 17.51 49.28
Revolving on one only 12,046 29,312,832 66.33 119.92 68.63 170.16
Pays full on both 10,782 18,239,430 0 0 0 0
Equal interest rates 2,845 6,293,817 0 0 0 0
No balance on either card 47,655 0 0 0 0 0
Total 234,387 330,495,722 24.65 48.63 23.26 60.15
Note: Table shows summary statistics for annualized interest savings from a counterfactual “steady state” where
individuals optimize balances across the credit cards we observe in our data, subject to the constraint of not
exceeding their credit limits. See Section 2.2 for more details on the sample construction. The exchange rate
was £1 = $1.32 at the midpoint of our sample period.
67
Table A4: Actual and Optimal Excess Payments on High APR Card by
Quintiles of Economic Stakes and Card Age
Quintiles
1 2 3 4 5
i) Dierence in APR
Dierence in APR (%) 0.81 2.03 3.78 6.44 14.98
Actual Excess Payment (%) 50.09 50.45 51.20 51.45 54.38
Optimal Excess Payment (%) 97.00 96.96 97.36 97.66 96.40
Dierence (%) 46.91 46.51 46.16 46.21 42.01
ii) Total Payment
Total Payment (£) 63.82 125.98 204.23 350.22 1658.91
Actual Excess Payment (%) 51.98 51.14 50.78 51.37 52.28
Optimal Excess Payment (%) 99.51 99.08 98.87 97.86 90.32
Dierence (%) 47.54 47.94 48.09 46.48 38.04
iii) Financial Stakes
Financial Stakes (£) 1.20 3.70 8.08 17.50 101.91
Actual Excess Payment (%) 50.41 50.49 51.35 51.51 53.80
Optimal Excess Payment (%) 99.18 98.85 98.30 97.55 91.52
Dierence (%) 48.77 48.36 46.94 46.04 37.71
iv) Dierence in Due Dates
Dierence in Due Dates (Days) 1.03 3.48 6.48 10.83 17.93
Actual Excess Payment (%) 50.80 51.50 51.69 51.68 51.81
Optimal Excess Payment (%) 97.19 97.14 97.04 97.01 97.04
Dierence (%) 46.39 45.63 45.35 45.33 45.23
v) Age of High APR Card
Age of High APR Card (Months) 3.82 5.57 7.50 9.50 11.48
Actual Excess Payment (%) 42.24 42.10 42.20 42.73 44.04
Optimal Excess Payment (%) 97.50 98.56 98.66 98.12 98.19
Dierence (%) 55.26 56.46 56.46 55.40 54.15
Note: Summary statistics for actual and optimal excess payments on the high APR
card by quintiles of economic stakes and card age. Excess payments are calculated
as the percentage of payments on a given card after subtracting out repayments
needed to pay the minimum amounts due. Cells report mean values within the
quintile. The two-card sample is restricted to individual × months in which indi-
viduals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for
more details on the sample construction. The exchange rate was £1 = $1.32 at the
midpoint of our sample period.
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Table A5: Annualized Interest Savings Under Dierent Repayment Rules
Percentiles
Mean Std. Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Annualized Savings in £
Optimal Payment 64.82 115.33 2.46 7.80 24.78 70.39 167.41
Balance Matching −4.59 89.29 −61.82 −14.91 −0.32 12.43 49.06
Heuristic 1 15.06 112.66 −50.98 −12.86 0.42 21.32 90.99
Heuristic 2 6.06 94.77 −51.09 −12.61 0.68 19.93 72.03
Heuristic 3 −4.59 89.29 −61.82 −14.91 −0.32 12.43 49.06
Heuristic 4 −1.68 103.18 −70.42 −16.85 0.60 20.47 69.62
Note: The two-card sample is restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an
economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for more details on the sample
construction.
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Table A6: Goodness-of-Fit for Dierent Models
(1) (2) (3)
RMSE MAE Corr
i) Main Models
Uniform Draw (0,100) 36.59 30.05 -0.00
(0.08) (0.07) (0.00)
Optimal 35.09 25.38 0.31
(0.12) (0.11) (0.00)
1/N 23.00 18.19
(0.06) (0.06)
Balance Matching 23.89 17.07 0.47
(0.08) (0.06) (0.00)
ii) Alternative Heuristics
Heuristic 1 (Pay Down Lowest Capacity) 36.46 27.28 0.08
(0.12) (0.11) (0.01)
Heuristic 2 (Pay Down Highest Capacity) 33.52 23.88 0.29
(0.13) (0.12) (0.01)
Heuristic 3 (Pay Down Highest Balance) 35.29 25.94 0.27
(0.12) (0.10) (0.01)
Heuristic 4 (Pay Down Lowest Balance) 34.20 24.68 0.10
(0.13) (0.12) (0.01)
iii) Machine Learning Models
Decision Tree 19.42 15.03 0.53
(0.07) (0.05) (0.00)
Random Forest 16.24 11.63 0.71
(0.07) (0.05) (0.00)
XGBoost 17.51 13.17 0.65
(0.07) (0.05) (0.00)
Note: Goodness-of-t for dierent models of the percentage of pay-
ments on the high APR card. The rst column shows the Root Mean
Square Error (RMSE), the second column shows the Mean Absolute
Error (MAE), and third column shows the Pearson Correlation Coe-
cient, which can also be interpreted as the square root of the R-squared.
The two-card sample is restricted to individual ×months in which indi-
viduals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. Goodness
of t is calculated using the 20% hold-out sample and standard errors
are constructed by the bootstrap method. See Section 2.2 for details.
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Table A7: Goodness-of-Fit for Dierent Models, Round Number and Non-Round
Number Payment Samples
Round Non-Round
Number Sample Number Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RMSE MAE Corr RMSE MAE Corr
i) Main Models
Uniform Draw (0,100) 34.04 28.36 -0.01 36.90 30.30 -0.00
(0.19) (0.19) (0.01) (0.11) (0.10) (0.00)
Optimal 36.40 30.65 0.25 32.86 20.81 0.35
(0.18) (0.17) (0.01) (0.24) (0.20) (0.01)
1/N 17.64 12.63 -0.01 22.99 18.60 -0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07) (0.00)
Balance Matching 22.00 16.81 0.38 23.11 15.61 0.53
(0.14) (0.11) (0.01) (0.13) (0.09) (0.00)
ii) Alternative Heuristics
Heuristic 1 (Pay Down Lowest Capacity) 36.17 30.33 0.03 34.98 23.71 0.13
(0.19) (0.17) (0.01) (0.21) (0.18) (0.01)
Heuristic 2 (Pay Down Highest Capacity) 35.11 29.34 0.21 30.90 19.19 0.37
(0.21) (0.19) (0.01) (0.20) (0.16) (0.01)
Heuristic 3 (Pay Down Highest Balance) 34.23 28.80 0.31 34.81 23.02 0.25
(0.17) (0.16) (0.01) (0.23) (0.19) (0.01)
Heuristic 4 (Pay Down Lowest Balance) 36.39 30.32 -0.10 30.20 19.03 0.28
(0.20) (0.18) (0.01) (0.21) (0.17) (0.01)
iii) Machine Learning Models
Decision Tree 15.58 11.62 0.49 19.94 14.92 0.57
(0.11) (0.09) (0.01) (0.12) (0.09) (0.01)
Random Forest 13.47 9.71 0.66 16.79 11.25 0.73
(0.11) (0.08) (0.01) (0.12) (0.09) (0.00)
XGBoost 14.16 10.53 0.61 17.78 12.58 0.68
(0.11) (0.08) (0.01) (0.12) (0.09) (0.00)
Note: Goodness-of-t for dierent models of the percentage of payments on the high-APR card.
The rst column shows the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), the second column shows the
Mean Absolute Error (MAE), and third column shows the Pearson Correlation Coecient, which
can also be interpreted as the square root of the R-squared. Round and non-round samples are
dened by whether repayments on the high APR card are multiples £50. See Footnote 35 for
details. The two-card sample is restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an
economically meaningful allocative decision. Goodness of t is calculated using the 20% hold-out
sample and standard errors are constructed by the bootstrap method. See Section 2.2 for details
on the sample construction.
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Table A8: Heterogeneous Types from 3-Way and
4-Way Horse Race Models
Win % (1) (2)
Optimal 20.13 18.46
1/N 24.10 18.22
Balance Matching 55.77 49.10
Uniform 14.23
Note: Table shows percentage of individual ×month obser-
vations that are best t by dierent models of repayment
behavior. The target variable is the share of repayments
on the high APR card. All results shown in the table are
based on the 20% hold-out sample. See Section 2.2 for more
details on the sample construction.
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Table A9: Correlation Matrix of Input Variables to Machine Learning
Models
APR(H) APR(L) Bal(H) Bal(L) Pur(H) Pur(L) Lim(H) Lim(L)
APR(H) 1.00
APR(L) 0.49 1.00
Bal(H) 0.14 0.14 1.00
Bal(L) 0.12 0.11 0.36 1.00
Pur(H) -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.08 1.00
Pur(L) -0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.04 1.00
Lim(H) -0.01 0.04 0.61 0.23 0.16 0.08 1.00
Lim(L) -0.07 0.06 0.23 0.64 0.09 0.13 0.36 1.00
Note: Table shows correlation matrix for the input variables to the machine learning mod-
els. APR is the Annual Percentage Rate, Bal is the balance, Pur is purchases, and Lim is the
credit limit. (H) indicates the high APR card and (L) indicates the low APR card. The two-
card sample is restricted to individual ×months in which individuals face an economically
meaningful allocative decision. See Section 2.2 for details on the sample construction.
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Table A10: Machine Learning Models Variable Importance
(1) (2) (3)
Decision Tree Random Forest Extreme Gradient Boost
Variable Importance Variable Importance Variable Importance
Low Card Balance 0.21 High Card Balance 0.21 High Card Balances 0.25
High Card Balance 0.19 Low Card Balance 0.18 Low Card Balances 0.24
Low Card Credit Limit 0.13 High Card Credit Limit 0.13 High Card Purchases 0.19
High Card Credit Limit 0.12 Low Card Credit Limit 0.12 Low Card Purchases 0.17
Low Card Purchases 0.16 High Card Purchases 0.11 Low Card Credit Limit 0.06
High Card Purchases 0.18 Low Card Purchases 0.11 High Card Credit Limit 0.04
Low Card APR 0.00 High Card APR 0.07 Low Card APR 0.03
High Card APR 0.01 Low Card APR 0.07 High Card APR 0.02
Note: Table summarizes the importance of input variables in explaining payments on the high APR card in decision tree,
random forest and extreme gradient boosting models. Rows show the proportion of the total reduction in sum of squared
errors in the outcome variable resulting from the split of each variable across all nodes and all trees.
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Table A11: Sensitivity Estimates Machine Learning Models Variable Importance
(1) (2) (3)
Decision Tree Random Forest Extreme Gradient Boost
Variable Min Max Variable Min Max Variable Min Max
Low Card Balance 0.18 0.26 High Card Balance 0.21 0.22 Low Card Balances 0.24 0.25
High Card Balance 0.15 0.19 Low Card Balance 0.20 0.20 High Card Balances 0.23 0.25
Low Card Credit Limit 0.12 0.18 Low Card Purchases 0.12 0.12 High Card Purchases 0.16 0.17
High Card Credit Limit 0.10 0.11 Low Card Credit Limit 0.11 0.12 Low Card Purchases 0.15 0.16
Low Card Purchases 0.09 0.18 High Card Purchases 0.11 0.12 Low Card Credit Limit 0.06 0.08
High Card Purchases 0.11 0.20 High Card Credit Limit 0.10 0.11 High Card Credit Limit 0.05 0.05
Low Card APR 0.00 0.03 High Card APR 0.07 0.07 Low Card APR 0.03 0.04
High Card APR 0.00 0.03 Low Card APR 0.06 0.07 High Card APR 0.03 0.03
Note: Table summarizes the importance of input variables in explaining payments on the high APR card in decision tree,
random forest and extreme gradient boosting models. Rows show the proportion of the total reduction in sum of squared
errors in the outcome variable resulting from the split of each variable across all nodes and all trees. The min and max
values are the minima and maxima from machine learning models ran on 10 partitions of the 80% training sample used in
Table A10.
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Table A12: Interest Savings from Optimal Dynamic Model
Panel (A): Optimizing Payments and Spending
Percentiles
Mean Std. Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Savings in £
3 Months 4.09 6.23 0.16 0.75 2.17 5.16 10.06
6 Months 15.25 20.03 0.66 2.97 8.64 20.53 38.20
9 Months 33.22 43.68 1.46 6.34 18.65 44.56 84.47
12 Months 57.78 76.53 2.55 10.80 32.01 77.39 148.74
Panel (B): Optimizing Payments
Percentiles
Mean Std. Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Savings in £
3 Months 2.96 1.12 0.05 0.40 0.65 3.46 7.30
6 Months 12.00 16.35 0.45 1.61 7.38 18.81 24.21
9 Months 27.45 36.73 0.06 4.62 16.50 35.65 71.38
12 Months 38.45 50.26 0.83 7.59 21.93 50.88 99.28
Note: Table shows accumulated interest savings at 3, 6, 9 and 12 months from
the optimal dynamic model. Savings are calculated as actual interest due minus
interest due from the optimal dynamic model. Panel A shows savings from op-
timizing both payments and spending, Panel B shows savings from optimizing
payments only. Two-card sample restricted to individual × months in which indi-
viduals face an economically meaningful allocative decision and then remain in
the unrestricted data sample for 11 consecutive months. See Section 2 for details.
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Table A13: Correlations Between Payment Rules
Panel (A): Balance Matching vs. Min. Pay Matching
(1) (2) (3)
Same Slopes Dierent Slopes Floor
Correlation 0.96 0.86 0.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Panel (B): Balance Matching vs. Actual
(1) (2) (3)
Same Slopes Dierent Slopes Floor
Correlation 0.63 0.41 0.50
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel (C): Min. Pay Matching vs. Actual
(1) (2) (3)
Same Slopes Dierent Slopes Floor
Correlation 0.61 0.28 0.23
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
Note: Table shows correlation coecients (standard errors in parenthesis) be-
tween balance-matching payments, minimum-payment-matching payments, and
actual payments on the high APR. “Same Slopes” sample is account × months in
which the minimum payment is determined by the percentage formula on both
cards, and the percentage is identical across cards.“Dierent Slopes” sample is ac-
count ×months in which the minimum payment is determined by the percentage
formula on both cards and the percentage diers across cards “Floor” sample is
account × months in which the minimum payment determined by the oor value
on both cards held by the individual, e.g. £25.
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Table A14: Summary Statistics for Autopay (11% of Observations) and
Non-Autopay (77% of Observations) Samples
(1) (2)
Both Cards Both Cards
Non-Autopay Autopay
i) Actual and Optimal Payments
Actual Payments (%) 51.21 51.11
Optimal Payments (%) 74.36 58.42
Actual - Optimal Payments (%) 23.15 7.30
ii) Actual and Optimal Excess Payments
Actual Excess Payments (%) 51.29 52.26
Optimal Excess Payments (%) 96.97 97.73
Actual Excess - Optimal Excess Payments (%) 45.68 45.47
Note: Table summarizes actual and optimal payments, and actual and optimal payments in ex-
cess of minimum due. The autopay sample is dened as observations where individuals make
automatic payments on both cards. The non-autopay sample is dened as observations where
individuals do not make automatic payments on either card. The two-card sample is restricted
to individual × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative deci-
sion. See Section 2.2 for details on the sample construction.
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Table A15: Goodness-of-Fit for Dierent Models, Autopay and
Non-Autopay Samples
Both Cards Both Cards
Non-Autopay Autopay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RMSE MAE Corr RMSE MAE Corr
i) Main Models
Uniform Draw (0,100) 34.04 28.36 -0.01 36.90 30.30 -0.00
(0.19) (0.19) (0.01) (0.11) (0.10) (0.00)
Optimal 36.40 30.65 0.25 32.86 20.81 0.35
(0.18) (0.17) (0.01) (0.24) (0.20) (0.01)
1/N 17.64 12.63 -0.01 22.99 18.60 -0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07) (0.00)
Balance Matching 22.00 16.81 0.38 23.11 15.61 0.53
(0.14) (0.11) (0.01) (0.13) (0.09) (0.00)
Note: Goodness-of-t for dierent models of the percentage of payments
on the high APR card. The rst column shows the Root Mean Square Er-
ror (RMSE), the second column shows the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), and
third column shows the Pearson Correlation Coecient, which can also be
interpreted as the square root of the R-squared. The autopay sample (11% of
observations) is dened as observations where individuals make automatic
payments on both cards. The non-autopay sample (77% of observations) is
dened as observations where individuals do not make automatic payments
on either card. The two-card sample is restricted to individual × months
in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision.
Goodness of t is calculated using the 20% hold-out sample and standard
errors are constructed by the bootstrap method. See Section 2.2 for details
on the sample construction.
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Table A16: Horse Races Between Alternative Models,
Autopay and Non-Autopay Samples
Panel (A): Uniform vs. Balance Matching
Both Cards Both Cards
Non-Autopay Autopay
(1) (2)
Win %
Uniform 32.46 21.29
Balance Matching 67.54 78.71
Panel (B): Balance Matching vs. Optimal
Both Cards Both Cards
Non-Autopay Autopay
(1) (2)
Win %
Balance Matching 75.21 61.02
Optimal 24.79 38.98
Note: Table shows percentage of individual × month observations that
are best t by dierent models of repayment behavior. The target vari-
able is the share of repayments on the high APR card. Panel A compares
balance-matching repayments against the lower benchmark where the
percentage of repayments on the high APR card is randomly drawn from
a uniform distribution with support on the 0% to 100% interval. Panel
B compares optimal model repayments to the balance-matching model.
The autopay sample (11% of observations) is dened as observations
where individuals make automatic payments on both cards. The non-
autopay sample (77% of observations) is dened as observations where
individuals do not make automatic payments on either card. Samples are
restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an economi-
cally meaningful allocative decision. All results shown in the table are
based on the 20% hold-out sample. See Section 2.2 for more details on
the sample construction.
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